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CHAPl'ER 1.
Introduction.
During the 1980s considerable attention was focused on. the need to develop
institutions to draw populations into development efforts. Local government
was the recipient of much of this attention.
This study is concerned with the role of local government in development, and
problems that are experienced in playing a developmental tole. Ill.",particul~, it
,;
is concerned with international experience of local government as a
development institution, and the relevance of that experience to SA.
The rust question, asked in chapter 2, is 'what is the role of local government
in contemporary society?' Various outlooks are examined in brief. What
emerges is a view that local government ,is predominantly concerned. with the
provision of social services. This function is variously conceived - the neo
classical tradition asserts that local-government is limited to intervening In.tbe
economy in order to adjust the allocation of resources for. market failure.
Alternatively, in a neo ..weberian outlook, the local state intervenes in the
process of consumption in order to cater to SQpHuly defined needs of the
" \'.
community. Cockburn's anaf~sis is Similar, for'lt.lcal government
II
ensure services necessary for social reproduction are available.
1
to
economy and nation, at the expense of a base in the community. This poi~{tsto !/
//'JI
//
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I. .. J
developty~l1t is reviewed. The record is bad. Local gcvemment.has in m~y
r . • I
countries not had the capacity to play a.snbstantial role in devf;lopmenjlefforts.
II
Much of the inefficacy of local government is traced to its. ~;JbOrdinftion to the
/ /
national centre, and efforts to limit it to playa role as an 1,ldjunc/to the private
~ #
P I
sector. l
/I
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In such analysis local government is subordinate t~:~\)henational government,
For Duncan and Goodwin local government is conjunctural, the result .of a
wide variety of social forces, both national and .local in nature. Local
government, while dominated by national government, has. the c;tpacit~~to'
,: . . .: // """<::,.-,
influence the locality. Local government may simply ameliorate the ttffects of
'"
the larger political economy, or it may be. a prt;~:sure point for an economy
based on the satisfaction of comnlunity need. This points to the potential role
, of local government in develapmeet.
I;'
All the interpretations of the role of local government accord great weight to
the nation and the economy. Local government is subject to obsolescence and
s-; ~.':"''':':::.\....:
redefinition if not serving the functi;)~lal needs of the economy ana national
._. I_ ..-
centre. Contemporary local government remains under the influence of the .
the need. for local government autonomy.
//
In chapter 3 international experience of local government's impact bn
2
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Notwithstanding this Iocal governments. perform a wide variety of development
functions. It is an agency that is most commonly assqci~ted with urban
i.:
services, but also has an active role to play in the larger development process,
and has a role to play 13.8 an institution of affirmative action in the areas of race
and gender. This is especially true in small towns)' where it is often Que of the
/'i!
few agencies, or the Ol'Ar agency, concerned with.development.
Ii . . '
International experience also suggests that small towhs, and small town local
'.1' i\i\
\1
government are well served by policies which are ori~ntated towards the
j' ., i,;
development of a local economy. Such policies offer scope for egalitarian
development, and afford local government an opportunity to pLay a substantial
developmeut role.
Local governments are constrained in developing the local economy by a range~. . ';
of problems, including a lack of institutional capacity, Which takes the form of
a lack of skilled staff and a lack of financial resources.
Revenue sources available to local government are often limited by a range of
factors, amongst them the tendency of central government to retain taxes which
are politically and administratively easily collected for its own use, even' 'f the
\\ \ \
taxes are subsequently budgeted to local government, a lack of resources
available for tax collection, especially skilled personnel, a lack of Institutiona;
capacity with administrative systems unable-to collect taxes, community
II
4
resistance to the payment of local ~».'l.~tnment charges, and often, a politics]
) \
'. Iprocess that promotes 'tax-bashing'tz-:
. Local governments need, by and large, further sources of revenue, the ability
to vary the level of revenue, and flexibility to spend revenue.
The relevance of these lessons is discussed in chapter 4, with a case study of
Middelburg. It is apparent that the town of Middelburg is dependanton the
"
i'
'\
"white" town, industrial and comrnercial districts for the revenue with which to
provide services. In particular, it is dependant on rates, service charges, and t()
\)
a lesser extent, subsidies, for revenue. For capital expenditure it is dependant
on the capital markets. In general the finances of the 'town, as it is presently
,.
constituted (ie as the "white" town) are in a healthy state. The town also
enjoys good relations with the state, notwithstanding a range of restrictions on
its activity which limit its d~yelopment effort.
The town council is focusing On the expansion of the Iarge-scale manufacturing
sector for its future development. It is depending on its position relative to the
'\
PWV to-draw industry, ..and the existing presence of a few large fact6rles. The
f/
Council sees its role as maintaining the development of infrastructure to
facilitate such development. Council officials are wru"'j of development paths
that are orientated more towards the needs of majority of the community,
5
:
Middelburg has not shown substantial in4hstrial growth since the mid-1960s,
:I
':.1
and the wisdom of the development path outlined can be questioned. It is clear
that the development path outlined is likely to favour those presently skilled
and part of the political process of the town. It is suggested that this results
from Middelburg's divorce from its local base, its undemocratic nature.
It is suggested that international evidence suggests tnat small town growth is
promoted With policies shat are focused on the region in which the town is
it
situated, ~nd sectors in which labour intensity is high. Agriculture and agro-
processing, in particular, make a great qontribution to development,
\0,
particularly in association with policies of land r~form and r&llstribution. Such
. d ~
d 1 is al aI,·iIevelopment IS so more eg ttarian,
9 i,l
In the case of Middelburg the town has \k. range of factors which support such a
development path. The Council can play avaluable role in re-orientating the
town to facilitate such development. The Council has a valuable skill base
which can ge utilised. for the development of the town. These include planning,
engineering and financial skills. The Council is, however, constrained by
inadequate revenue at present.
Substantial s~fpe exists to increa~e revenue from the present sources of
Ii "I
finance. Additional revenue sources are also necessary, but the Council is
constrained by central-state legislation which limits the form of revenue
6collection it can engage in. It also does not have easy access to easily collectied
(i
forms of revenue, which are under the control of the central state.
\\
o
7CHAPTER 2.
The Role of l..ocaI Government in Capitalist Society.
question to be addressed is What is the basis of the activities of local
government'?
,'-:
As shall be seen, the answer can be variously conceived. The answers will be
refe,,r1srJ'to,implicitly or explicitly, in the following chapters, for the role of
local government underlies activity (and non-activity) of local governments.
<)
The question will be looked at in a number o£ sectioas, The first section looks
at the fun~tion~\l~ole of local government ul~I1,~~classicaleconomic theory .
.'t /:1\v/ j
Arguably this th~H)ryforms the basis of the hegemonic understanding of local
" .' \ <,.:-,
(> '~j
govemmel1i~.,i,:)I:;O!1temporary society. Following this brief reference will be
.;
made to nee ...weberian outlook, after which the marxist approach of Duncan
and-Goodwin will be examined ill more detail. A ;~vie<f~;the influence of
\\
nation and economy, influence which is a decisive deterArinant of the activities
of local government, forms the final section.
()
o
2.1 Local G9vemrnent Fl!ru:1ions:m Neo-classical ThouiIDt.
N~o-dassical economics articulates a triple role for the public sector at large,
to "supplement the mechanisms of the' private sector in adjusting the allocation
of economic resources, to bring about desired changes in the distribution of
income and wealth, and to achieve stabilisation of economic activity, or more
generally, to attempt to reconcile the goals of price stability, full employment
and fast 'growth'". This can be summarised as an allocative function, a
distribution function, and a stahm~tion function.
Richardson rejects a distributive role for local government on the basis that
attempts by local government to pursue distributional policies will simply off-
set or reinforce central government policies, undermining national initiatives,
and/or will undermine Iocational efficiency as firms and people move in
response to local distributional measures. He argues that distributional policies
are rather the domain of central government, and that central government
should adopt policy measures able to deal with local distributional questions as
part of a comprehensive package of measures.
1 Richardson, H: The urban public economy. London:
Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969, piS7. See also the cLasjsLc
public finance text, Musgrave, R and Musgrave, P: public
Finance in Theory and Practice, 3rd ed , London; MacgJ::'awHill,
1.980 I pp6-1.1, for greater detail. '
8
9The absence of a stabilisation role follows from:
/' firstly, from the relatively inflexible demand for local government
services and its relation to population size
* secondly, the considerable geographical leakage from local measures
adopted (especially fiscal measures)
* thirdly, the absence of local authorities's monetary policy powers
which limits their interventions to the fiscal. level, imposing severe
stresses on the local budget, and
* finally, because stabilisation policies undertaken by one local
authority might well have destabilising effects or/other local authorities
and indeed, for the larger metropolitan centres, on national stabilisation
policy.
Local governments do play an inadvertent stabilisation role in the course of
H
\'
\
their activities, as they frequently undertake development activity at a low
\\
point in the business cycle. This arises from the lag between the time' when
deCis~ons for development are undertaken, and the time when 'work actually
starts. Such h. stabilisation role is, however, incidental. to the lirriit~tions of the
\\
\.
stabilisation 1~01ethat this framework of analysis accords local governments.
Richardson sees more of a role for local government in the sphere of
\,-_j
allocation-, The role is rooted in the correction of market imperfection and
2 Ri.chaJ;dson, op .. cit. T pp18S~~·192.
10
failure, a role of adjusting the inadequacies of the market which fails to
achieve an optimal allocation qf resources due to the presence of ecohomies
and diseconomies external to the decisions Of the private sector.
. The private sector will not produce public goods because of their nature as a
good from which it is difficult to extractprofit (obvious examples include
street lighting or low cost housing), or because the production of such goods
according to market dictates will result in substantial public harm (such as, the
uncontrolled emission of pollutants in the course of producing a good that has
a market value). Local government should provide either for th~ production
and distribution of goods whose impacts are local in nature' that will not be
provided by the market, or for the regulation of the production and distribution
of goods which entail public harm. In short, the market either produces too
much or too little of certain locally needed goods, and the role of the local
government is to intervene to correct these imbalances.
In practice, of course, the distinction between an allocative, stabilisation and
distributive role for local government is a fine one. tow cost housing
't/ ~,
construction by t,helocal government has an allocative effect in .~hatsociety'S
resources are shifted to an area deemed tQ,\ be socially necessary, but that
activity can be distributive if accompanied by an element of subsidy I and be
\\
\'\
3 Musgrave and Musgrave; op.cit, p9.
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locally stabilising if'itakilflg place in a recession, especially-if using local
building materials.
Local government, according to this outline of neo-classical views, internalizes
market externalities, Typically this comes down to providing services such as
health, education and housing which are not provided by the market, especially
for lower income groups, due to the absence of a profit motive.
((
Which level of government should be responsible for providlne services is a
;i
'I
matter. to be decided by a number of (technical) criteria. Amongst these are':
1. the optimal area of administration and
2. the presence or absence of scale economies in particular services,
3. the degree of areal spill-over from service provision in a locality,
and
4. the related question of the constituency to which r-~enefitsaccrue.
Democracy is external to the model of local government - indeed, the basis of
citizen control of the activities of local government is consumer sovereignty,
rather than direct control of the activities of the local government. And
consumer sovereignty, ideally, is exercised as citizens choose particular~\
services in preference to others provided through the maximum use of market
mechanisms. For those services that are not provided by the market,
4 Richardson, op. cit, p195.
.•. ,I
The understanding of local government that is d~spl~fyedis both instrumentalist
,
\,
and' economistic. It is instrumentalist in that the loc~~ state and local
government can variously be seen as a business coq~ration, a consumer co-
li
operative respons1ble for the distribution (and perh~~s\'prOduction) of various.
r: ; !\ 1!
services or, aihd ~1()re frequently, art agencyof the 1~entra1state. The local
, ! Ii
government il~deJlneq by its function. and cruciall~I its efficiency in
" ·ll
performing that function. It is economistic in that tI!ie instrumentalism is
ii'
~) . " .. . .. . . . . ~economic, ca:ncemed with economic questions of t1i~extent, quality, cost and
,
I'
form of service delivery. More generally, local government derives its
,
legitimation from the notion Q'f. economic welfare,' J~measure that limits the
,
I
concept of what constructs a decent standard of livi~lg. Local government is
subject to economic dysfunctionality; the strncturesiof local govern~enti'are
il
replaced as soon as they are-no longer functional the provision otl,ne~bssa.ry
services.
5 Ibid, p192. j
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The concept of local autonomy and local polity is absent from the orthodox
understanding of local government. Community control is reD,~gatedto
consumer sovereignty, or a concern with increasing the efficacy of
development efforts by promoting community participation. While present, it is
marginal to the substantive basis of the existence of local government. The
very concept of development is constrained by its concern with the raw
provision of services, without consideration of the mode of supply of the
services, and the stresses and strains acting upon thatmode of supply. In the
/f
end, e political basis of local government is .both'ieconomic and determined
by the national state. If local government is not serving the purposes of both
the national economy (as understood by the national government) and the wider
interests expressed by the national government, it is functionally obsolete, ana
subject to replacement.
2.2 The Functipns or\tocal ~;)vernment in NeowWeberiall Th~ory':!.
\~-~/ - - - --- - - - '. i\
The dual state thesis of Saunders argues that distinct political prOCeSSf\Soperate
(i
in the local state, for while the central state intervenes in the process of
production, the local state intervenes in the process of consumption. Thus the
central state is concerned to address the principle of private property and to
r.iaintain levels of profitability, and the local state 'addresses itself to questions
of social rights and needs. The central state operates through a t;focess of
I' r'
corporatist mediation, while the local state develops policy through a plurality
of competitive political struggles. Interests mobilized around the central state
,I
14
originate in production, the interests of industrial and finance capital, trade
unions and professions, while the local state cuts across class .lnes to form
itself around consumption groups such as tenants associations, welfare
recipients and parents.
The theory usefully draws attention to the existence of the differential
constitution of central and local states, and to the range of social forces
represented in the local state. Yet at root the theory is weak perhaps because
the division between consumption and production functions does not reflect
actual a~fi'}(itiesof local government - roads, housing and other infrastructure,
( ,\
for example, cannot be considered to be consumption. As shown above, the
local state is rooted in and emerged out of support for production activities.
Corporatist practices, too? are not unique to the central state.
The theory starts from a position of functions determining.political'process;
and the functions of the local state, related to consumption, are determined.a
priori. It is not clear that the functions and. process attributed to each level (If
the state is an appropriate conceptualisation, with t,llinima~historical evidence
to support the view. In short, the argument is functionally deterministic.
2.3 Lo~al Government Function in Marxist 'tbought.
Cockburn in The LOCG.ll State' argues that the local state and other local
institutions are part of the entire state apparatus, in tum a complex of
15
relatively autonomous ~Ilstitutions for class domination, mediating a range of
'I
competing demands of fractions of capital. Thus "local councils don't spring
from ancient rights of self-government but are, and under capitalism, always
have been, an aspect of national government under the state'".
The local state differs institutionally from the national state as it is concerned
with social reproduction, throughfamilies and local institutions, while the
national state is more concerned with the basis of accumulation. It is, however,
shaped by class struggle along with central government. The local state then, is
not shaped apart from the central state, but is subject to the same national
processes bf class domination and social reproduction. While local state and
government is not reduced simply to a set of functions, it is set apart from
-national government only by the functiqns it performs.
The analysis is hindered by a view of the state-as simply an instrement of class
domination. Arguably, the local state'can be better conceived as both an agent
of and an obstacle to the national state. It is also insufficient to conceive of the
specificity of the local state in functional terms. This abstracts from the
question of whether the very functions of the local state are subject to conflict
and bargaining.
6 Cockburn, The Local state, pz , quotied in (,~'ycan, Simqn
and Goodwin, Mark: The local state and uneven deVelop-ment. r:}
London: Basil Blackwell, 1988, p33.
16
A~:"hlten1ative approach, argued by Duncan and Goodwin", is to view the
lcicaI state as the resalt of social relations, or a set of institutions that embody a
range of social. relations. Thus the local state is constantly changing in
response to changes in local and wider societal relations. Bach town is unique,
for inasmuch as the local state isdominated by the national centre, it is also
the product of a process of uneven development, where social relations in the
locality develop in response to the particular characteristics, p:~)culady
economic, of that town.
A distinction is drawn betwee~ the state form and state apparatus. The state
form describes the power relations that the state mediates in carrying out its
functions. In essence, the state transmutes class and other (for example gender)
relations into atomised relations between individuals\\which then enjoy legal
~'''-c""",-
sanction and protection. These atornised relations, indeed, form a basis for the o
constitution of local government as "citizens" elect their local govemment. The
state apparatus refers to state institutions and the functions they perform. The
\.;\
state as a whole is the subject of social conflict and contestation. It plays an
II
interpretive role, interpreting and mediating the divisions in society.
The social relations expressed in the local state are not constant, but change
\'
over space and time in r~sponse to international, national and local 0conditions
i:...
7 Ibid, pp37-43.
.'1
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and struggles, representing the waxing and waning of social forces that are
contesting' the local ,state and wider society.
At the same time, the local is not simply dominated by the national or
international, but is rather both causal and contingent. It is causal in that local
forces can cause a change in local ,}olicies. Thus working class organisations
can redirect lo~~ state activity to the construction of affordable houses, given
the correct conditions such as a legal framework that allows the local state to
engage in housing construction. It is contingent in that the locality acts on and
shapes larger social processes. While the larger political economy can dictate a
necessity for a hlgh tech industrial area, the contingent nature of ~ace dictates
that only certain locations. are suitable for such a development (locations that
are near major transport roots, for example) and local forces can then act to
determirte~he precise)~on of the development, and industrial development
~~", //
'''". f~
rail ~-.:;.I(more gene. y.~ !",,,,cc'~''''\
~!! ~
'~., , "'\ \
This gives rise to the n~~ f~r different policies in different places at different
~. ) .
times, and the need for \~hfflocal state to formulate and implement these
policies and activities.
Social groups can contest the local state and use it in opposition to centrally
dominant interests. In particular, and crucially, groupings marginalised in
8 Ibid, pS9.
uf fl.
t
\
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larger society can contest the local state to some effect, Civic mOvements, for
example, might contest the state apparatus, and in so doing they contest the
state form/the relations that are expressed therein, and the interpretations
\\
dominant in the local state as to the role it i)hould fulfil in society.
Such contestation is legitimised by, and based upon, the representative nature
-:
of the local state, a representative base that Iiaccepted and defended by large
parts of society.
Importantly, the functions that the state performs are seen as the result of
struggles that social forces engage in; "It is thus not its functions that give the o.~~J)
local state its specificity, but the contradiction inherent in its interpretive and
representational roles, a contradiction that is activated and sustained through
the uneven spatial development of social relations'!?
I~
'-,,,,-c~:/
Thus we have turned the question of the functional base of the local state and
government on it head. We have not adopted a managerialist framework, and
Viewed the functions of local government as simply a technical question of how
to provide services at the lowest cost. Nor have we accepted that the local state
simply plays an allocative role in the economy, or the mirror
conceptualisations that it is centred around consumption issues or is simply an
instrument of social reproduction.
9 Ibid, p43.
';;\
\\
\\
\\'c
The local state, and loca1'~;~~mment, is a vibrant body that incorporates many
II
of the"social relations e~/~t in society, along v.dth a range of social relations
j. .:-
19
located in local society. It is contested, and the functions it performsInfluence
that contestation and are !i",Ouldedby that contestation. The functions of the
local state are derivative, not primary.
This approach makes the clear point tbat the functions of local government are
not determined in an asocial, ahistorical way, but are rather the result of
decades of social conflict and bargaining.
1\\1
IIr,I
In examining the functions ibf local government in more detail, as will be done
below, the view that the local state should be autonomous to the maximum
"degree possible from central government is a starting point. Local government
should be rigorously democratic, accountable to the local community. This
follows not simply from the managerialist view that autonomous and
accountable local government is able to promote development efforts more
efficiently and effectively trnm,l if local government were simple agencies since
it will enable participation in development efforts, although we do not discount
this view ~but rather that local government follows from unequal spatial
,development and specific local situations, Autonomous local government is
II. ,
best able to meet local challenges that are faced. -,
Thus we would not agree that local government should be contested as a
precursor to, and example of what can be achieved with, control of the
,f\~
2011
?)ati.onalgovernment. According to this account, local authorities can help "set
the atmospherf in which central government can be changedv'", More
concretely, local authorities can develop policies, such as responses to a lack
of housing, which can later be adopted and adapted in the national context,
While in some (crucial)' spheres of local government activity (for example
housing policy and the promotion of women's interests), this might be valid, in
general the very fact thfJ.tlocal government is rooted in the locality precludes
Ii'
such a limited role f9! local government.
j
,/
c__;
2.4 Nation and Economv.
Much of the hegemonic contemporary understanding of the role and function
of local government focuses on questions of economic welfare, economic
development, resource availability and service delivery. It is also rooted in th~
concept of state, and overwhelmingly considered to be a subordinate: authority
to the central state. Questions of the role and functions of local government are
typically considered to be technical. Such a vie';'<is:::~ci.fed"explicitly by both
Richardson and Musgrave:
"Much of the need for increased urban government activity has developed as a
by-product of trends in the private sector II11, while the size, definition and
10 Gyford, J: The politics of Loca.l Socialism. London:
Allen and Unwin, 1989. p67.
11 Richardson, Ope cit, plS7.
I)
II
"II
role of local government is also a to a. significant degree, "a technical rather
1',
(,'I
v
21 1/Ii
Cc..,1
;//
than an ideological issueil12•
(~i"\";1
Magnusson counters, aptly, that "tlle very conventionality of most thinking
~bout local government makes the lineaments of bourgeois tho\.tght stand out in
\\
Magnusson" .argues that the economistic view of local goVernment has its
origins in the first local governments (borough corporations), formed by
merchants in order to offer urban services to the emerging urban communities,
f .• ""',
and more centrally, to the emerging (capitalist) mode of production. Servi~'e~
were made available. for the shareholders of the corporation, and sold to other
users. In ..that, local governments were similar to other corporations established
for mercantile purposes in the 18th and 19th centuries.
I "'\
i 1,
With the advent of free trade mercanolftst corporations were under pressure to
convert to public corporations as freer access to services, and a whole new
scale of service became necessary. New roads and streets, refuse removal,
clean water: new transport networkf;roo~ for railways, and
,.
12 Musgrave and Musgrave, op , oi t f p5.
13 Magnusson, W: "Bourgeois theories of local government"..
Political Studies, 1986, XXXIV,pl.
14 Ibid.
(J
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telecommunications were essential for the new, indnstrial, free enterprise
economy to work.
o
,",:,
Given that the costs of these services were difficult to recoup, it was seen to be
the responsibility of public corporations, controlled by property owners
(Share~~~derf,to provide these services cheaply and efficiently. The role of
the state as such was limited. The municipalities were seen as a part of civil
society, distinct from the state, and to be defended agahrt the encroachments
" "
of the central state.
The passing of laissez fair~ brought about a change of role for local
governments and brought into highlight the latter theme - they were soon to be
seen as agents of the central state (or th~bourgeois state)lS. The local state is
clearly subordinate to the central state, agencies that we may consider as
"trouble-shooters" providing a range of econontic, police and welfare services
under the protection and with the approval of the central state. Mill, a classic
theorist of local self-government, states the role of local government thus:
"The principal b~tsiness of the central authority should be to give instruction,
of the local auth~rlty to apply ittl16•
::
Ii
Ii
/'1
"----~--~-------~~
IS op, cit, p6. \,\
16 Mill, quoted in Magnusson, op, cit, ps ,
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Competition amongst communities ('()rrather their governing a;vthorities)
(i..
encouraged the adoption of this view. A municipal authority that did not
pursue the provision of services in as cheap and efficient a manneras possible,
suffered as economic activity moved to, or grew, where !:L '11, services were
available.
Notwithstanding this; it is clear that a view of local government being
determined by economic functional considerations together with a bias to. the
unified, centralised state has held hegemony over the last century. Magnussson
interestingly terms this the hegemony of democratic centralism, a term that
expresses the possibly contradictory central accountability and subjugation of
local governments and the localised democratic basis on which they are
c- cons~tuted.
--''<'
A common thread that emerges in the conceptions of local government dealt
with is that of local government being defined as an agency that is, concerned
with the provision of social services.
Neo classical theory asserts that the role of local government is determined by
the activities of-the private sector. Local g~:rvemmentis limited to intervening
in the economy in order to adjust the allocation of resources for market failure.
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Alternatively, the local state intervenes in the process cf consumption 'in order
to cater to socially defined needs of the community, needs defined in a
competitive political process. Cockburn's analysis is similar, for local
government intervenes to-ensure services necessary for social reproduction are
available.
In all of these interpretations local government is defined by its fun(,i;lons,
variously allocative, consumptive, and socially reproductive.
"For Duncan and Goodwin local government is conjunctural, .~6 result of a
/..;
wide variety of social forces, both na~y>.rial and lo~\\alin nature. Local
- ~
~\
government, while dominated by national governrneat, has the capacity to
influence the locality. Such influence may result in the amelioration of local
effects of general economic development, or may tend in the direction of the
construction of a locally orientated political economy,
In such an interpretation local government is defined not by function, but
rather its role-as a contested representational and mediatory structure.elt is an
interpretation that takes us away from functionalism, and points to the gains'
that can be had from contesting local state structures. That is important when
considering local government as a development institution.
An the Interpretations of the role of local government accord great weight to
the nation and the economy. Local government is subject to obsolescence and
redefinition if not serving the functional needs of the economy and national
25
centre. The role of the nation and economy in the development of local ~
government was examined, and found to be at its very origins. Contemporary
local government remains under the influence of the economy and nation, at
the expense of a base in. the community.
t\
I'.\
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CHAPf.E~R3.
I
The Functi,!l_l~sof Lecal Government.
It is often assumed by South Africans that apartheid has lent a uniqueness to
"
SA local government. At face value this is true ~ racially distinct local
'"government authorities in the same town do not occur elsewhere, for example.
This leads to unique problems such as the complete lack of legitimacy of
present structures, and a level of dispersion of communities.
Yet it is also an oversimplification. This chapter forms a yardstick against
which SA local government can be measured. SA local government, as
compared to local governments in many other countries, h31>many advantages
which enhance its potential as a development agency, particularly skills and
potential resources. On the other hand, SA focal government suffers many of
the shortcomings and limitations of local government in the developing world
more generally in a context of inadequate and unequally distributed services -
shortcomings and limitations which will have to be overcome if it is to fulfil its
potential. This chapter is concerned with the activities of local governments
around the world, with particular regard to small town local governments.
In the first section the development of local government will be reviewed, with
particular regard to the influence of the nation and the economy. As we shall
see, it is not possible to understand contemporary local government without
27
understanding the influence of these twO,)spheres,. in particular, on its
development.
Following this local government functions in various developing countries are
reviewed. The survey reveals the multi-dimensional nature of local
government, with a wide variety of development functions being performed.
The third area of focus is small town development and local government. The
first question to address is Why the interest in small towns? Those practices
and policies which tend to promote the development of small towns in a
fashion that benefits the mass of people in the town will then be reviewed.
Particular attention will be directed towards the influence of industry and
agriculture on small town development. As shall be seen, local government has
a particularly large role to play in small town development because of the lack
of institutionalised development capacity in such settings, its multi-dimensional
development nature, and the popular legitimacy of local government as a.
development institution.
The fourth area of focus is local government as a development institution', The
problems, potentials and requirements for effective development work are
addressed. One particular problem stands out, that of finance. Finance forms
the fifth area of concern, being the major single area of constraint on the
development efforts of local government,
28
3.1 LOCfilGovernment in the Developine World.
1/
Local government in Africa evidences a clear colonial legacy. At an
operational level, we find that local government is informed by western
concepts of how to go about organising local government - thus in French-
speaking Africa local government is highly influenced by the "Ftellch pattern II
while English speaking Africa (including SA) is highly influenced by the
IIclassical United Kingdom model II 17 •
The United Kingdom model encompasses five principals which have attained
the status of truisms in relation to the form and structure of local
government" -
* firstly, that local authorities should be institutionally separate from
central governmentand assume responsibility for the provision of a
range of services, ('\I
* secondly, that local authorities should be self-financing to the
maximum degree possible,
* thirdly, that they should employ their own staff, being reliant on
central government only for purposes of temporary access to skilled
personnel,
17 MaWhood, P: uDeCi~ntralisatiol'lf the concept and the
practice". In Mawhood, P,ed. t,ocal _government in the third
world. Chichester: John Wiley, 1983, p12.
18 Davey I KJ: "The changing pattern of local government~:
from McKenzie to McKinsey". In~ World Development, 1974 v2(2),
p71.
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* fourthly, that the governments should be governed by councils elected
by popular vote, and
* finally, that the central government's role should be. limited to
advisory and inspectorial services.
These principles are counteracted by a clear concern with, and centrality
attributed to, the questions of economic development and nation, whose genesis
and evolution in relation to local government will be briefly examined below.
instrumentalist view 01: local government as that which, as has been seen,
Local government in the developing world is subject to a similar
pertains in ex-colonial powers, for local government is subservient to key
national goals of nation ..building and socio-economic development'", The
everarching importance of these goals, the lack of an indigenous tradition of
local government structures relevant to a modem world, and the social
dominance of "national ruling elites (who) depend for both survival and still
more the capacity to organize change upon the centre being able to control the
periphery'v", has meant that local governments have been. susceptible to the
influence and control of the Jlentre and its fluctuating views, on appropriate
forms and objectives of local government.
19 Mawhood, P: !lIThe prc)bleftl of decentralisation for
governments". In Mawhood, P, ed. Local gov~armlient in the third
wO:J:.-lyj,.Chichester: IJohn Wiley r 1983, Pp249-25~~.
20 Maw'hood, op , cit, £)249.
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3.Ul Colonial Local Government.
I
I
Local. government under (British) colonial rule was relatively decentralized. No
doubt colonial modes of social control influenced this situation. A significant
influence in the development of representative structures of local government
was the policy of the 1947 Colonial Office to introduce an "efficient and
democratic system of local government in each dependency"?', in order to
increase the level of participation in the development process, in a more
efficient way than the central government is. capable of doing, and in a
democratic manner",
The policy of decentralisation preceded the nationalist struggles which brought
African nations indepei\ctence, but in most cases was supported by urban,
middle-class dominated national liberation forces who contested elections as a
strategy of mobilising political support amongst the rural peasantry. The
decentralised nature of local government was in II).fUlYcases strengthened prior
to independence as a means of limiting central control by the withdrawing
colonial forces.
21 K;;1sfir,N: "Designs and dilemmas: an overview'v• In:
Mawhood, P, ed. Local government ~n the third world.
Chichester: John Wiley 1 1983, p27"
22 Cochrane, G: Policies for strengthening Local
govermnent in developing countries. \.j'orldBank Staff Working
Papers. No. 582. Washington: World Bank, 1983, p3.
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At a more functional level, the motivation for opting for decentralised local
government lay in an appreciation of the necessity of knowledge of local
coaditions, often built up over generations, for the success of development
policies, and the importance of mobilising local involvement in development
projects as a precondition for their success. A lack of infrastructure, literacy
and widespread pov~rty which did not facilitate central control of development
efforts encouraged this devolutiorr".
3.1.2. Post ...Independence Local Government.
In the post-independence period decentralised local government became a
hinderance to national government. Other means of mobilising local support
and initiating development efforts were now possible, means that did. not imply
that opposition forces could retain a base of power in localities. Alternative
means were also available to train the populace in government.
Decentralised local government became irrelevant to the national development
of politics. Thus in Uganda a central government spokesman declared in 1969,
echoing Mill, that "district councils are no longer local governments but local
administrations and as such have to pursuegae policies of govemment'i".
23 !Oid.
24 Uganda Argus, 15 February 1969, quoted in Kasfir, op.
cit, p32.
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1:
Sen~ga1, Guinean, and Ivory Coast replaced the election of local officials with
appointment shortly after independence, Ghanaian elections were abolished in
1964, Kenyan responsibility was gradually transferred to appointed provincial
commissioners and central government departments, while in Botswana district
councils were transformed into administrative units of.rhe central bureaucracy.
The process was intensified in situations of radical change - thus the m.,iJitaryin
1/
Nigeria divested local governments of all authority in 1966, while thc.mllitary
: \ '
i}
in Ghana and Uganda completed what had started under civilian rule.
The Anglo-American tradition of local government provided some legitimacy
to the abolition of local government autonomy. So too did the very mode of
'1 •• "_:
I
British colonlat rule, for inasmuch .as indirect rule was a central tenet, it was
complemented by authoritarianism which did not tolerate dissent,
To this can be added the prevalence of notions that economic development
necessitates the central co-ordination of resource use in commandist fashion,
and disenchantment with the inability of local governments to reach planned
targets of output due to the absence of sufficient resources, qualified staff and
organisational depth. The solution, for many African governments, lay in
Kuanda's "decentralisation in centralism "25, or the curtailment of local
government autonomy while attempting to make central ministries responsible
in some or other form for: the provision of facilities at the 10C~~level. Thus,
I',
25 zambia's ~,h,ddelinefor the
Government Printer, 1969) r quoted
33
while many conditions, such as the fractured nature of civil soci,~ty in most
/"1
African na6.6ns, favour local autonomy, the pressure of central. government's
desire to control state activity has systematically undermined local government
autonomy, especially in the imm~.diate period after independence, without
necessarily increasing the state's control oV"?fsoCiety.
However, as the effects on development became clear, a round of local
government re..organisation followed in the 1970s with the intention of
-
increasing local participation in decision making and increase the ability to
respond to local problems. Local government was established as a relevant
development institution, but it remained, as shall be seen below, hindered by
central domination and control of resources.
3.2 Local G(wernment Functions around the World.
Surveys of local government ~. the developing world are few and far between.
The most insightfdl and comprehensive is that of Roger Smith".
The table from Smith'? reproduced below indicates expenditure patterns for
local authorities in cities from around the developing world. The data is twenty
years old, and suffers from several shortcomings that impede strict
26 Smith, R: "Finand>l.ng cities in developing countries".
IMF staff Working papers, 1.974.,VXXI, pp329-388.
27 Ibidt pp351-352.
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comparability, the key shortcomings being a measure of variation in the level
of government responsible for the provision of a particular service, and
different accounting practices for expenditure on the same service", Despite
,)
this, however, Smith is able to draw several conclusions from the data which
in all likelihood will have remained valid through time.
It is apparent that four functions are the recipient of the major portion of local
government expenditure, being general administration, health, education, and
public works.
Health commands a material proportion of resources, ranging from 37 % in
Ahmedabad to 2,9% in Recife. Education ranges from 37% it;!Manila to 0,5%
in Hyderabad. Africa has typically devoted 20%-30% of its resources to each
of the services, with substantial government subvention also occurring. The
significance of such ranges is obscured by toe fact that local government
responsibility for local services varies widely, with regional, state and centraf
authoritijs often paving responsibility for services such as health and
c-,
education.Local authorities may decide, even when they have responsibility
ior services, not to undertake the function (thus Calcutta spent only 3,8 % of its
income on education while being the prime government agency responsible for. .
the function, something it was able to do as it provide,g rudimentary schooling
//< c-
p
,/t'
"L
28 See smith, op, cit, pp346-348.
u
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for only half to two thirds olihHdren, leaving the rest witt'tout schooling and
no doubt working).
{I,;.
table from smith p350-351.
.from cochrane p41
!)
\1
\\
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oIt is to be expected ~hat general administration costs will form a major part of
expenditure, given that administration systems are necessary in order to run
any local government service. While the costs are a larger portion of
expenditure thftll for the cities in the table from the developing world than
those from the developed world - an average of 20,8%" of total expenditure for
the 27 cities from the developing world versus 2,3% for the three western
cities - this can be explained by the lack of skilled personnel which developing
local authorities encounter and consequent inefficiency, and the tendency of
administration costs to be income inelastic. For low income local authorities
r-,
administration expenses will therefore con(flme a greater proportion of the total
budget Thus we find that administration costs decrease asper capita
expenditure rises, Singapore and Seoul are two examples. Put another way, it
is a poverty trap, presenting surmountable obstacles to development, with
poorer cities resembling more of an employment service and less able to
deliver services to the population.
A final point pursuant to the table worth mentioning is the wide range" of
services for which local government are responsible. Roads, sanitation,
utilities, fire, police and housing cover the central areas, but it is evident from
the extent of the category "other expenditure" (it tange~1from 0,5% in
Ahmedabad to over 55 % in Sao Paulo) that a wide ralll!le of other sehic~s are
t.\ .. ; '. \f~~ ',.. i\
under the auspiCes o\1~9?Xgovernment. 'Perhaps theles~on from this is that
\\
there are few services which local governments: do not, h~principle, have the
\\
\\
\1
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potential to' provide, Other functions and potential functions of local
, \·1
government will be examin~ below,
3.2.1 Local Government as an AffIrDlative Action Agency.
J./
U
A function that is not typically considered to be in the domain of local
government, and consequently neglected, is that of addressing inequality. Local
government in West European countries, such as Britaia, is concerned with
" II'\' ,t
addressing bO'tb racial and gender inequality. The case of ~ocal gO'vernrn¥~~as
an-agency to' address gender inequality will be discussed in more detail below.
The lessons 'aI'GI also relevant to' other forms of discrimination.
In the case of gender local governments isolated tllft,need to' address gender
inequality expressed as unequal opportunities in local authority workforces, in
authority services, C1Jldinequality of outcome, fill' accumulation of:
other employment in the aut~lorlties's jurisdiction, in unequal access to local
discrimination which results. 1(1a discriminated social position reflected in
unequal ownership and control of resources;
In the case of Britain, Women's Committet1'~ and Women's Units wer(i.
;' , ' f
established in local gtwen1ments 11.)i~$tit\J(ionaU.se the fight for genq,~l;
equality, They we1:~tthe organislng ,!hech:anismswith the ability t9/pressure
l ~~j ,
/ \ ~.!,
, " " \.;
council departme~ts. Frequegtly trley w!~re also dispersed amongst departments
in order to' have day-to ..day/acc;~s to' tile activities of the council.
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They typically had the following aims":
* To promote the welfare and interests of women and women's rights
* To work for the elimination of discrimination against women in
legislation, policies and practices
* To encourage the adoption of positive action to p.omote real ~'Jality
of opportunity for women
* To encourage and support the development of women's groups and
organisations
* To open up the council decision making structure to women in the
community and make them more accountable to the community.
W"\)l1en's Units.functioned with varying degrees of success inside councils.
Frequently they were facedwith hostility from council officers and trade
unions, and marginalised, In more sympathetic surroundings they were, with
the help of measures such as employing Women's Officers with a high job
grading, successful in changing council programmes tackling service provision
to ensure the availability of creche facilities, access to housing for single
mothers, and developing employment generating and training initiatives geared
to the needs of women, and more generally re-orientating council services
that they are accessible to those in the greatest need. Councils have also had
<,~heiremployment criteria examined with greater employment of women as a
result, and have challenged discriminatory employment practices in their
29 Riley, K: "Equality for women- the role of local
authorities". Local governmgntstudies I 19901 16(1), p53.
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jurisdictions. A more dispersed but nevertheless important result has been a
challenge to professional understanding ~p.areas such as street and building
lighting, and building design, and a challenge to rigid departmentalism which
was dysfillllctional to the provision of services that were r~rquired by.the
e'
II
community. " ;',::
Frequently such programmes had the spin-off of enhancing council
effectiveness and efficiency. Qualified women could be recruited with the
provision of flexi-time posts and child-care facilities, and training programmes
enhanced staff capacity to deliver services". Such successes challenge the
notion or efficiency ~ is an efficient service one which simply minimises costs
or one Which is also rooted in the needs of the community.
In the literature on local government in a developing context the question of
gender is noticeably absent. Yet women play a key economic role in
developing societies, while also suffering the effects of political and economic
marginalisation. Local government, if ~tis concerned with addressing the needs
of its constituents, has a clear and decisive role to play in providing services
that are accessible tolocal women. From the experiences of West EUlfJP~
\\
women a key requirement is the active involvement of women in the day \to
day operations of local government, and the development of affirmative action
30 Ibid, p49.
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programmes that are integral to the activities of the authority. It is perhaps this
lesson that is relevant to the situation in South Africa.
3.3 Small Town Local Government and Development.
3•.3.1 Why Small Towns?
Recently considerable attention has been focused on the question of the role of
small towns in development. Hardoy and Satterthwaite" put forward five
reasons for such attention, while Rondinelli" puts forward three.
For Hardey and Satterthwaite small and intermediate urban centres:
'* Firstly, are the centres with which the majority of rural people
interact in the developing world.
* Secondly, are politically important, being centres from which national
political control is exercised, yet also centres that are marginalised in a
centralised political system. Any challenge to national centralisation of
resources and political access is assisted if the dynamics of such centres
31 Hardoy, J and Satterthtva:Lte, D: "Why Small and
intermediate urban centres". In: Smal.l and intermediate urban
centres: Their role in national and regipnal development in:
the third world. London: Hodder and stouqhton, 1986, pp6-9.
32 Rondinnelli, D: "Small towns in developing countries:
Potential centres of growth, transformation and integration".
In: Kamm.eier, HD and swan, PJ, ads, Equity with Growth?
Planning perspectives for small towns in developing countries.
Bangkok: AIT, 1984, p11.
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are understood, and if poli<iies to aid ecO'1~;:nicgrowth in the, centres
are formulated. * Thirdly/could playa pivotal role in national
government priorities such as increasing agricultural production and the
provision of infrastructure for rural development.
* Fourth, can lessen the tenden>}jffor productive and bureaucratic
\,
activities to concentrate in primate cities.
* Finally, have a role to play in managing urban growth in primate
centres when there is a sound rationale for devoting resources to such a
purpose.
o
Rondinelli argues that attention has been focused on small towns because of,
* fi~"ly, the prevalence of theoretical arguments for "a diffuse and
integrated system pf settlements to promote economic growth with
'I
social equity" ,
,\
I
* secondly, reactibhs against failed macro-economic approaches to
development that f£dIed to consider the role of marginalised areas of the
,::::~,)
country, and
* lastly, pragmatic considerations of the nature of urbanisation and rural
\
Small towns, then, can playa si*nifi.cant role in providing services and outlets
to the adjacent rural populations, and in so doing can relieve pressure on: major I,
\" "
urban conglomeratlens, They can create a more balanced urban hierarchy.
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Economically such centres can generate wealth in marginalised areas, while,
politically, challenging the national concentrations of power"
On the other hand, and implicit in the above, interest in small urban centres is
also based on disenchantment with strategies for rural development. In many
countries, in Africa especially, rural development is hampered by the inability
to generate economic activity that is self-sustaining. A.griculture was
prioritised, but it meant little in countries where produce had no means of
"effective distribution. To illustrate, Tanzania managed to ~et only 9 % of its
cotton crop to market in 1988 - 21 000 tons of 235 000 tons' harvested by
peasants", A dispersal of resources across agricultural regions also meant an
low level of resource availability in a particular area, diluting the development
impact of the spending".
Such arguments rests on the view that, in Rondinelli's words, "an articulated
and integrated hierarchy of settlements provides potential access to people
living Jhroug,~out the country to markets of different sizes and to a wide
1\ .
variety of urban amenitiesv", while "in market economies a diffused and
integrated system of central places is a necessary but not a sufficient condition
33 Maliyamkono and Bagachwa: The, second econdmy in
Tanzania_ tOl"ldol'l: James currey, 1990, p14i.
34 D Rond,inelli 1 op. cit, p19.
35 P Rondil,elli, op .. cit, p13.
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for achieving widespread economic development''". Further, it entails a view
that the economic benefits to flow from development efforts concentrated in
primate cities are seriously distorted by social costs external to the economic
calculations",
Enthusiasm for the development of small towns, must of course be tempered
by caution. Substantial evidence exists" that small towns can serve as a basis
for both national political control and economic exploitation of rural
hinterlands. They can be considered the main element in "a spatial order for
capitalistic exploitation?f9• Especially in developing societies, with their
governing authorities firmly under central control and direction, small towns
form the basis for the national political centre and its associated elite to
consolidate and extend their control of dispersed areas of the country, where
(;
previously national political control was weak. Small towns cart also form the
basis for local elites and international economic forces such as transnational
corporations to extend their influence across the rural hinterlands. This is
reflected in tendencies such as increasing concentration of ownership of land,
undermining the local economy (see p47 below).
36 D Rondinelli, op. cit, p12.
37 D Rondinelli, op. cit, p15-1Ei.
38 Adelemo, IA: "Small towns: centres of growth or centres
of exploitation?". In: Kanuneier, HD and Swan, PJ, eds, Equity
with Growth? Planning perspectives for small towns in
develoaing countries. Bangkok: AIT, 1984, pp30-32.
39 Ibid, p1.56.
II )1 ..
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It is clear, however, that small towns have historically not provided the
economic growth that they are capable of doing. The basis of sm311town
development will now be reviewed.
3.3.2· Small Town Development.
According to Ganapathy" the "role and functions which small towns may
now be expected to perform centre around the concept of an equitable regional
development", offering services to rural areas and providing a link between
urban and rural spheres. Rondinelli discusses the development functions of
small towns". They include:
* Offering economies of scale which will allow for adequate health,
education and other social services
* Offering a wide variety of consumer goods and commercial services,
both through formal and informal enterprises
* Offering services as marketing centres for rural products with
associated services such as transport and insurance
* Offering a base to small-scale manufacturing enterprises, especially
those orientated to goods in local use
* Offering an agro-processing base
40 Ganapathy I RS ,: 11spatial development, sroa:lltowns and
publio polioy: the Indian experience". In: Kammeier, HD and
Swan, PJ, eds, Equity with Growth? Planning perspectives for
small towns in developing countries. Bangkok: ArT, 1984, p207.
41 D Rondinelli, op . oit, pp20-27.
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* Offering off-farm employment and migrant employment
* Offering transport and communication services
* Offering services to increase agricultural productivity
* Functioning as centres of social transformation in absorbing
urbanising migrants, fostering urban values and behaviour, and
providing new opportunities for social and economic mobility.
//
(,
Hardoy and Satterthwaite, in perhaps the seminal review of small town
development, provide an in-depth :1iscussion42, drawn from 150 papers, of the-
basis of development of small urban centres. Small towns are typically based
economicallyon government, agriculture, mining, the military and/or
transport, with industry playing a secondary role.
The influence of government, the military and mining are in large part outside
the control of the local community, informed /",y-freaks of nature and central
.state policy. They will therefore be mentioned briefly before a more detailed
account of the impact of agriculture and industry.
Government activity in a town is often a key element in whether or not a town
became part of developing road and rail networks. Besides generating a local
42 Hardoy I J and satterthwaite, D: I!Asurvey of empirical
ma.terial on the factors affecting the development· of small and
intermediate urban ('entres". In: Small and intermediate urban
centres: Their role in national and regional develoEment· in
the third world. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1986, pp278-
334.
oeconomy in itself through the impact of multip~er effects of government
,~\ ,:,
\\
expenditure> government activity is also key to broader economic deveI6pment.
\)The presence of suitable transport networks is a necessary compop,ent for the
I t
/;
long-term development of the local economy. In essence that is a COi1huon
il sense point - no area can expect to develop over th~>l_pngterm in isolation
\\
from other regions of a country or indeed the world. HOwever, it is important
to note that aceessability of the area is not a sufficient condition for
'<,:
<:-;
\\ development. In fact it ma)' even be detrimental, for goods may be imported
\\
\\
\\(hich destroy some of the local producthlf, base, Obvious examples are local
"/
handicrafts industries or local crops grown at a greater cost than in other
regions".
3.3.3.1 The Infhienee of Agriculture.
'\
\'
The relationship between urban developmentand agriculture.js a complex one, \
for agricultural activity mayor may not ~enerate urban ec\;)noIi\~\cactivity.
" .;,
Factors which are of importance in determining agriculture's impact on urban
activity include the nature of production, the structure of agricultural land
ownership, the structure of marketing operations, a[ icultural pricing policy,
and taxation policy. These factors influence, often subtly, whether an area's
a
a Ibid, pp303-307.
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agricultural output is maintained within a region, or is lost to primate and
metropolitan centres •
..The question of the land owning· structure is a euphemism for the degree Of
6:pncentratio£l of ownership. With a more concentrated ownership of land local
enterprises that stock the large range of goods needed will not be viable, while
the Iandowners will have a greater access to intermediate or metropolitan% 'n
centr~~, and will bypass local centres. Local centres will then be dependant on
the wage earners, most of whom will be earning a relatively low wage as is
common \practice in agriculture. An egalitarian land ownership structure is
therefore tnore beneficial to the development of small towns",
The nature of the production that is undertaken, too, can subtly influence the
nature of ownership that develops. Hardey and Satterthwaite quote the
instance" Of the Brazilian government's attempts in Cruz das Almas to slow
,:-:,'j:/
the out-migration of rural inhabitants by replacing tobacco crops with higher
income earning citrus. Due to the highly capital intensive, and low labour
intensive (compared to tobacco) nature of. citrus production, something which
was overlooked in the planning stage, a considerable out-migration of rural
dwellers, and inor~1se in the concentration of land holdings, resulted. :Even
\\
when the crop remains the same, but land holdings concentrate following
~ Ibid, p293 and p300.
45 Ibid, p298.
\\
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changes ;,n the nature ,pf production due to, for example, the pursuit ()r-C7'~~-
II pr{l(luctivit'l enhancing.and labour saving wbrk methods, substaneial out-II "J
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migration from both rural and urban areas results. Small towns decline as the
() ,
;'--.
new land holder~oy-pass the local urban centres.
\" u, ',', " ~, I ))
The interaction between the pattern of land ownerssip and the nature of
production is thus a crucial varlable.jn the fortunes of small towns, Other
factors ;hi~hindicate declining fortunes for small towns include the presence
of foreign land owne,ship in the area, especially ownership of plantations, a
'" /)_·;<{Gl ~
'\ . .,.
decline in world prices for commodities in •local production, and the presence
"of vertically in~grated marketing .eperations for agricultural produce that steer
/1 i"r-:
produce to. !'((ajor centres.
While the evidence of the industrial impact of growth centre strategies based
on decentralisation policies is negative", agriculture, on't~eother hand, is an
, ,-': "', -r-r, __ ,I
important generator of industrial activity.
Growth centres provide a small impetus todtWe16Jment efforts in the locality.
Much of the impetus that the growth centre policy does provide is si~oned off
" " .-!)
ttl larger urban centres. The.Ievel of multij~lier link between smaller and larger
46 Ibid, 'pp34,2-353.
growth centres is great, while the link between larger and smaller growth
centres is small. Growth centres have tended to hay, the resources made
available appropriated by groups outside the target area, or by local elites.
Little effect has reached the poor in the area to which the policy is applicable.
Where it has the cost of creating employment has been astronomical, and
companies have remained uncompetitive without subsidies due to their remote
site.
IIf the absence of factors peculiar to an individual centre, if an industrial policy
is possible for smaller centres, it exists around consumer industries that will
satisfy local demand; which in tum implies economic growth and/or
"
restructuring in order to promote the expansion of consumer' demand, or the
production of goods that are competitive on the international marker",
Industry that is successful in smaller towns includes weight-losing and bulk-
reducing processing of agricultural products, and further value-added
processing of agricultural products, consumer industries that cater to 10~1a1
needs and tastes, building materials Industries focused on local needs, and
assembly, mixing and finishing activities of national or international
companies. The combination is one of externally- and regionally-based
economic links.and growth.
3.3.3 Small Town Local Governments.
-.-. -.-~------
47 Ibid; Rond.inE=-1Up op , cit, pp336-338.
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By way of summary of\, it can be noted that local governments are perhaps the
obvious development inl;i~tution in small towns. Their multi-dimensional
nature, established in section 3.2) makes them ideal for a setting which will
not support specialised instl..';utions.Beyond providing services and
infrastructure, as section 3.3 :indicates, local governments have a key role to
play in promoting the development of the larger local economy, particularly in
making the town accessible to people from rural hinterlands in a fashion that
allows for the participation of the mass of town dwellers.
Amongst the potential development activities of local governments are the
promotion of marketing facilities, p~tticularly markets for agricultural produce,
providing infrastructure, incentive and facilities for agro-processing and
I',I
industry geared to the local market, and more generally stimulating the
Jormation and development of developmentjnstitutions such as credit agencies
and co-operatives. In principle, the devellopment activities of local governments
\ .•
are constrained 'only by the resources av~~lable to it.
Local. government is, however, constrained by a range of problems which will
be discussed below. Amongst the problems that small town local governments
face is a lack of authority, with the central state seeking to control their
/\
\ 'j
activities by withdrawing or limiting their authority to engage in activities to
encourage development, a lack of skilled personnel, which can form a base for
the central authority to control the activities of local structures, and a dire lack
of finance which limits the authorities' development efforts, even when the
/'d
t,i
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authority has authority, power and skilled personnel", As a result, local
governments are "fragmented, confused about their functions and all too often
either invisible or largely ceremonial 1149.
The financial problem is not limited to areas with small economic bases to
draw on, but also to towns which serve as administrative centres, are on
transport routes, and have a substantial industrial base", As a result, these
local governments have a limited, if not negligible, capacity to act as
development institutions.
All of these key problems emerge as a problem of centralisation, with local
governments in dispersed areas of a countt:y.subordinate to national centres of
economic, political and administrative power. More 'than that, they are
subordinate t6" centres through which sub-national and sub-regional
population's nea1s and priorities are articulated and passed to higher levels of
i
government: the centres frq~hwhere many sub-national and all sub-regional
developm, }It potentials and resources are assessed: the centres through which
many development tasks are planned and implemented, taking the
responsibility off national agencies; the centres through which infrastructural
~8 Ibid. Also cochrane, op, cit, pS, and Rondili:,n.elli, D:
"Increasing the access of the poor to urban servicelS:
Problems, policy alternatives ~Jndorganisational choices". In:
Rondinelli, 0 and Cheema, GS, ens. Urban services in
developing countries. London: M\~cmillan,1988, p30.
q
<19 cochrane, ibid, p5.
50 Hardoy & Satterthwaite I OPe cit, p292.
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and public services should be provided and maintained for urban centres anti
for the regions and sub-regions over which they have jurisdiction; and the
centres through which local revenues are raised'?'.
3.4 Local Government in Development and qS a Development Institution.
Cochrane states that "few developing countries have fully recognised the
contribution that local government can make in achieving national development
goals", a fact that is underscored by a survey of national development plans of
54 nations by the International Union of Local Authorities which showed that
the development potential and role of local government was not examined in
any". This forms part of the difficulty in assessing the role of local
government as a development institution. Local government does, however,
have advantages over other forms of development institutions.
3.4.1 The Comparative Advantages and Problems of Local
Government.
Cochrane (drawing on the classic formulation of Creech-Jones in 1947)
considers these advantages as comparative advantages. Amongst them are the
51 Hardoy, J and Satterthwai t\~, 0: "Government policies
and small and irltermediate urban centres". In: small and
intermediate urban centres: Their role in n!ltional and
regional development in the third tvorld. London: Hodder and
stoughton, 1986, p366.
SA . •~ Cochrane, op. Clt, pl.
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(potential) democratic basis of local government, a basis that ~rtentia11Y)
II
allows for easy acceptance of arid participation in development \~fforts, and the
. ' \\
II
fdct that local government efforts will (potentially) be mote rooted in the needs
of the community than the activity of the c;~ntral government and will be able
to use the resources more efficiently. The widespread acceptance of and
support for the concept (if not. the practice) of local government makes such
institutions key development Institutions".
These comparative advantages are sometimes posited as the source of
disadvantages. Problems such as the shortage of trained. and experienced
personnel, lack of finance and stifling central control of finance are frequently
posited as a result of the inefficiency of local government, in turn the result of
the key comparative advantage of local government, its roots (or potential
roots) in the local community and polity. The critique of local government is
o
then based on efficiency criteria. The critique hinges around the question of
"democracy versus efficiency", with those qualities posited as contradictory in
many ways.
Such critiques conflate fundamental resource weaknesses of local governments,
the problems of developing an efficient democratic culture, the difficulties
I
inherent in pursuit of efficient modes of implementing development work and
mechanisms that act to promote efficient operation, the difficulties inherent in
S3 Ibid, p5.
promoting participatory modes of development and the complex requirements
for a sophisticated development institution to work.
As we have already seen, the notion of efficiency is not a clear one. In the
case of meeting women's needs for services, a clear challenge is posed - is
efficiency to be defined as efficiency of a local government in meeting the
needs of its constituents, in using the least amount of resources possible in
meeting the needs of those constituents, or simply, in managerial terms, using
the least amount of resources in day-to-day operations of the authority.
3.4.2 Economic Development and Local Government.
The financial stress of local government around the world points to the need
for economic growth to finance urban services. In situations of high population
growth and/or urbanisation and a stable per capita cost of urban services the
absence of economic growth means that the provision of urban services will
simply consume an increasing proportion of the gross domestic product of the
country. Services become unaffordable.
A <cyclethen comes into play, as urban services form a necessary condition for
industrialisation which will in tum support urbanisation. The absence of
economic activity and growth, and in particular the absence of industrial
concerns and industrial growth? undermines the revenue raising abilities of
local authorities, limiting the ability to provide the very services necessary to
56
foster economic development -.A cycle of deterioration of urban services is
o
then entered into, as local authorities are unable to maintain, l~place,
modernise and expand their services.
Such a cycle is especially applicable, and a special danger, to small urban
centres which typically do not have a large industrial base and agglom~rafion
economies to offer industry, or as great economies of scale in service provision
as the l~ger urban locations. Local government, as outlined in chapter 2, is
not typically seen as having a role related to economic development per see
Such a role is drawn from and subordinated to larger determinants of the role
of local government. In the neo-classical tradition (see p8), its role in
promoting development is incidental, drawn from its actlvities as an institution
or set of institutions that is concerned with the allocation of society's resources
!\
U
to purposes not.served, or served inadequately; by the market. Alternatively,
its development role can be seen as being drawn from its concern with socia,1
reproduction (see p15), ie its development role is confined to a concern with
those activities that are functional to the reproduction of society. Another, and
/1
more encompassing role for local government;' is that it can playa role in
economic development that is geared in the locality (see p16), responding to
differential local effects of general economic development, and attempt to
stimulate developmen~r~1~f:l~Cal basis, or ameliorate the effects of
developments over Vi~~~hit his no control.
OJ
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Local government is constrained t~)be an institntien acting to provide those
services that are necessary for dev~~lopment,and intervening to ameliorating
< •
the effects of development, in man~(cases only those effects 'that threaten
stability and accumulation. But loca\t government, because' of its democratic
nature, also has the potential to act ss a conduit for the. aspirations and
i-··'\. "
'. \.. '
demands of the community.
Cochrane" makes the valuable point that the breadth of the role that local
I;-:':::_~~
government is able to fulfil is dependant on the ieso~fes available to it. More
strongly put, with "more capable personnel and a well developed capacity to
generate revenue it can assume responsibility for a greater range of economic
development functiQPsll. Put another way, '~hegreatest task that developing
\<,
countries face at p'..reS~l\tis to involve the growing number of poorly trained
and poorly paid local govemment officials in the development processv".
Local government is most well placed to develop services that interact with the
community directly. The evidence indicates that such is in f(!zt the role'that
/-,'
local governments play around the world (see p? above). JpeCially in settings
\
'\
which do not have the economic basis for a plethora of develt.'Ipment
institutions, local governments offer a range of skills and resources, offering
54 Ibid, p7 and 1142.
55 Ibid, p23
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the potential for local governwe.,,;!s to playa developmental role far beyond'
//
that of simply providing in~~structural services.
i/ e/
i(::,~~,
Magnusson" provides a furtfier caveat to enthusiasm for the role of local
government, for while the local state is viewed as an agent of the absolutist
central state its functions are potentially comprehepsive, The cost is
,t/
:\ I
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subordination to the centre.
Two key requirements for an active and development orient\1tep local
government, then, are independence from the central state'. ;ld finance.
DiSCUsSi\nrWi turn to finance.
'\ ,I
\\~(
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3.5 The #lnancing of Local Government.
l
It is often assumed that local governments are in the best position, as in the
western World, to provide urban services. Yet the problem has grown past the.
present financial resources of most urban governments. After summarising the
. \'.,
forms of financing typically availablexo local governments, the influence evn.,
central government on the financing crisis of local government and the
problems of financing, will be reviewed below.
3.5.1 Forms of Financing.
56 Magnusson, op , cit, pp6-7.
\\
:_;.,
(
Revenue! SOurcesvary 7~;fu,areas under the influenceof the Anglo-American
,~/ /, f 1, ~- 0
.l
tradition local government tends to have substantially greater fiscal autonomy
r:
than local government in previous French colonies. and in Latin America.
African and Asian nations schooled in British local government rely heavily on
property taxes of one form or another. These taxes are the responsibility of the
local governments themselves. In South America sales taxes, in {theform of
revenue sharing w)(h central government-form the bulk of revenue for local
government, while in other areas more obscure but very effective taxes such as
gambling taxes make a sribstantial contrlbution".
" ' U
In general, local government revenues ate drawn from areas such as property
taxe$,~licences on. arms, fctdiQS, trading activities, motor vehicles and ~uch, the
constnlcti9fl and rental' of such facilities as abattoirs and markets, cbarges on
<. v., {,"":'.
the provision Qf utilities' (often through the activities of enterprises' under local
government control) and poll taxes.
ffersonal income taxes have been attempted in many countries throughout
Africa, either as a tax levied by the local a4.t[iority or a surcharge on national
.--~~'==:;
income taxes which then return the tax t9 the local authmjty Ii They have
proved politically and administratively difficult to manage, being very
unpopular and requiring considerable administrative infrastructure. Cf\·\Nries
as politically diverseci{~~y~ and T~lzti0lia removed such taxes from the
·1 "
\\~ .
.--;:
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57 Cochrane, op, cit} pp11-20.
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ambit of local governments in the 19605 period of post-1.~depe~kience
consolidation, and moved to indirect taxes.
User charges attempt to obtain payment for services from consumers, by
charging rates yielding a commercial return on the current replacement COS'~sof
capital assets, or to yi©ld'a commercial return which incorporates debt service
charges, or marginal cost pricing in which charges are calculated on the basis
of full capital and operational costs of providing a service.
User charges have been applied particularly to utilities, where the. opportunities
for cost recovery are greater ~ince' the costs of the service can easily be tied to
particular households and there is an easy means of enforcing payment by
terminating services. In some services, such as water and transport costs are
more difficult to recoup for economic, political and social reasons. Water is
clearly a social necessity, with considerable negative impact for the wider
community.if water supplies are terminated for non-payment, while the
absence of transport has considerable impact for the economy more generally
which make it worthwhile subsidising. In yet other services, such as clinics,
cost recovery is all but impossible on social and political grounds.
Considerable manoeuvre is available to local government around the recovery
of user charges. In Br~Jil the cost of sidewalks has been recovered from
"
II
61
property owners }NIfo have benefited from the construction", Such a method
is easy to administer, entailing a calculation of frontage in order to assess the
value of each property.
Grants form a considerable component of resources available to local
governments, averaging 30-60% of urban local government revenue, and 70-
95%59 of rural local government revenue. "Theytypically take the form of,-. ... 1:
formula grants, project specific grants" and matching grants in which.rhe
central state tops up revenues raised by the local authorities. SJ}ch grants tend
to favour wealthier areas. They are often made on a per capita basis, but can
also' be used to equalise local government spending between different areas of
thecountry. Key requirements for,grant systems are that the grant does not
replace local governmenr'revenue collection, and the grant pool should be
elastic, risingwi~;::Ule development of the economy. Few countries meet these
;:/
criteria, wit}(ihe noun that central govemment plays an increasing role for
./ /
loc~}iovernment revenue and the reduction of central government remittances
'over time (in real terms) as. the pool does not expand. In general, grants ,y
t, f
require considerable administrative effort if proper account is to pe kepP.
Property taxes form the core of self-raised local revenues, but have not proved :.,
up to the task of financing local government. Property taxes are attached to the
I '"\
" )
\"
53 Ihid, p14.
59 Ihid, 1'15.
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fair rent value, capital improved site value, and unimproved value. The
specific basis on which the tax is attached as, for example, a capital improved
site value property tax will impede the development of property sites, while an
unimproved site value might favour the wealthy who own developed sites and
will pay 'at a lower rate relative to the value of the property than those with
unimproved sites. A considerable constituency of those who can word to pay
tax will be untapped. Property taxes pose considerable administrative
problems, typically requiring a data-l1p.seof property in the jurisdiction which
is drawn up {rom a cadastral survey,
\~
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The provision of credit to local governments is another source of funds. Credit
is provided by the central government, in the form of direst loans or indirect
loans through a parastatal local government finance corporation. The former is
a preferreri practice in Latin America, the latter in Africa.
Credit through the banking system is very. tare. In Tanzania an interesting
practice occurs where local governments are required to deposit recurrent
funds in a central pool which is then used for credit purposes. Essentially the
local governments, under central intervention, have formed their own bank in
order to maximise the use of funds. A similar scheme is to be found in the
Philippines, where local governments are required to keep several month's
operating revenue on deposit with the central bank. The central bank uses a
part of these funds as a soft loan scheme for poorer local authorities.
t.:
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3.5.2 Central-Local Relations.
Complete financial independence is not possible as the tax. base is constrained
by the local base available for taxation, and local government also has a
limited ability to control large and complex tax administration schemes which
the central government is capable of administering. It is not desirable as the
central government clearly has a significant role to play as a facilitating agency
for local government, especially in poverty ridden districts, and in areas which
completely lack institutional capacity, as a controlling agency:
\\
In the arena of facilitation the central government (or other appropriate
institutions) can playa decisive role. in areas like the training of skilled finance
personnel, in recommending accounting and budgetary control measures, in
assisting in the raising of capital (providing guarantees), and assisting in the
development. of appropriate institutions for the assistance of local government.
The centre is also needed to monitor and control the raising of funds, and set
minimal national standards for the activities of local authorities.
However, in order to advance local autonomy local governments should have
the capacity to vary the forms and rates of charge they levy60. Local
governments should also prioritise the charging of commercial rates for
60 Dhiratayakinant, K: ItRural service centres,. local
government and fil~ancial autonomy: the case of Thailand". In:
Kalnmeier, EDand Swan, PJ, eds , Equity with Growth? Planning
perspectives for small towns in developing countries. Bangkok:
AIT, 1984, pp532-534.
64,
services, should/maximise the use of local taxation, while central grants should
preferably be used to equalise differential tax bases, to ensure the provision of
\.',
socially desirable services, and for capital expenditure",
While there is a clear role for central government, the idea of fiscal autonomy
receives considerable coverage in th, literature as a key component, indeed a
necessary condition, for the development of locally autonomous local
government. Thus "it has generally been accepted, in the theory 01) public
finance, that local autonomy, hence local government and development, cannot
be realised in actuality unless it is accompanied by effective l~al autonomy.
This implies that local government must be financially independent of the
central government as much as possible by imposing sufficient local taxes
and/or other such levies (such as fees and charges)"6Z.
Fiscal decentralisation is often assumed to be a panacea for local government's
problerrl::Sof obtaining resources. As Cochrane points out, however, fiscal
decentralisation is meaningless in a context where local government does not
have the resource base to collect taxes and levies. He quotes the instance of
Brazil, where the central government took away local government
61 Ibid, pp532-534.
62 Ibid, p532. The conc Lus Lon is supported by a wide range
of writers, including Cochrane, op. cit, in his survey of
pOlicies aimed at strengthening local government, p7, and the
world Bank: "strengthening Local Government in Sub-Saharan
Africa". World Bank EDI Policy Seminar Report G.1. Washington:
World Bank, 1989, p7.
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responsibility for collecting taxes, instead collecting taxes itself with its more
substantial resource base. As a result, local government's share of federal taxes
grew from 14% in 1976 to 24% in 198463•
3.5.3 Problems of Financing.
Local governments have in instances taken the initiative to act as development
agencies assisting those in the private sector. Here again the problems of
inadequate resources and skill levels have stymied their best efforts.
Cochrane" documents problems as basic as not incorporating the cost of
capital inte the cost of the development efforts. The consequence is that the
projects were a. drain on scarce local government financial resources.
Taxes available to local government frequently suffer the shortcoming of being
relatively difficult to collect, with evaders difficult to track down. Enforcement
requires personnel and associated costs often beyond the economic benefit of
the revenues collected given the effort required to track down and the low
level of tax applicable to each offender. Evasion of local government taxes is
USUallyin excess of the level of evasion of central government taxes, with up
to 50% evasion of local property taxes not uncommon". As a result, local
63 Cochrane, Ope cit/ pp9-10.
64 Ibid, p19.
65 Ibid, pll.
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governments struggle to meet existing demand for' their set\"iices, let alone meet
the demand for further services.
A further problem which local governments face is community resistance to
the payment of taxes. Cochrane argues that it is difficult to "disabuse local
people of the idea that all development expenditures are a central government
responsibllity''", while Mawhood states that "the argument that people-have
insufficient money to pay local taxes, naive as it is, is widely accepted?",
with the position worsened by populist modes of politics where 'tax baslfing' is
a widespread means of harnessing political support. The consequence of such
trends is that the development potential of local government is under-utilized.
On similar lines, Manning argues" that the lack of financing available to
small town local government arises not so much from a lack of capacity, but
rather from limitations which are of a bureaucratic, legislative andlor
democratic character. In the area of legislation there are numerous tax-exempt
properties, frequently those properties which are most able to support a tax
burden such as owner occupied houses, government building and industries.
66 Ibid, pll.
67 Ma,wnood; P: ttDecentralisati('n, the concept and the
practice". In Mawhood, P, ed. Local government in the third
world. Chichester: John Wiley, 1~83, p~6.
68 Manning I R: "Small town financing: Where does the money
come from?". In: Kammeier, HD and Swan, PJ, eds, Eguity with
Growth? Planning perspectives for small towns in developing
countries. Bangkok: AIT, 1984, p69S.
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established under industria; incentive schemes. In the area of bureaucracy the
z-
!
key problem is onerof the development of administrative systyfXI,Sable to deals
1,' \ <-
with the demands 9fi local governments. Many local authorities presently lack
a system which can\ •.deal with property taxes - a system that establishes and
maintains a data base of all properties in an area of jurisdiction of the
i!
authority. Democratic constrainer'arise from the political process, with elected
officials often wary of imposing taxes which can prejudice chances. of re-
election.
3.6 j:onclusion.
Thischapter has reviewed international experience, particularly African
experience, of local government and its role in development. From the cha~ter
certain points stand out as key to the development of local government, and
given the importance of local government in the small town context, to the
development of the larger small' town economy with an active local
government:
* While local government is informed by principles which entail' autonomy, it
is frequently in practice subordinate to the priorities of nation-building and the
economy. This subordination has 'actively undermined local goy~rnment in
, ,
\
\
many circumstances .
..
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* The mechanism of subordination is most,r'lrttcularly in the area of finance,
" \. 0
and points to the need for financially indep(.Juel{t local government.
* Local government performs a wide variety of development functions. It is an
agency that is most commonly associated with urban services, but also has an
active role to play in the larger l~evelopment process, and has a role to playas
an institution of affirmative action in the areas of race and gender.
:« Local government has an especially important role in small towns, as it is
typically one of the few locally-based, democratic and participatory
development institutions.
:« Its multi-dimensional nature enhances its role in the small town context
where alternative institutions are often not available.
* Small towns are subject to a wide range of influences outside their control.
Nevertheless, policies which are orientated towards the development of a local
economy, as opposed to the international or even the national economy, offer
scope for egalitarian development, and afford local government an opportunity
to play a substantial development role,
* In order to foster the local economy small-towns should foct1~)on the
!/
multiplier link between the small urban centre and ffhe rural hinterland, which
'\\\
is conditioned by a number of factors, the key amo~gst them the question of
o
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who benefits. from rural policy. This points to the undesirability of attempting
to influence the spatial location of industry through infrastructural development
or incentive schemes in the absence of supporting social, economic and
political fundamentals and the importance of policies that are focused on local
development witha high degree of linkage. Agricultural development, in
(I i< '. '\ - .
conjunction wit\\ land reform programmes, and agro-processing have a major
role to play.
* Local government can promote such development through the prevision of
facilities for the emergence of industry, distributional facilities, training, and
co-ordinating development activities, amongst other interventions.
* Local governments face a range of problems, including a lack of institutional
capacity, which takes the form of a'Iack of skm'.;,'1staff and a lack of financial
resources,
i\< Revenue' sources available to local government are often limited by a range:
of factors, amongst them:
\\
>\ 1\
* thy tendency of central goven,llment to retain taxes which are
politically and administratively easily collected for its own use, even if
the taxes are ibseqUently budgeted to lccal g~vernment,
* a lack of resources available for tax collection, especially skilled
personnel,
I)
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* a lack of institutional capacity, with administrative systems unable to
collect taxes,
* community resistance to the;payment of local government charges,
and
* often, a political process that.promotes "tax-bashing' .::::0
\i,
* Central government retention o(,those taxes that are easier to collect leads to
\"'.,,./
the viciorts cycle of lack of revenue, deterioration of service, and consequent
inability to finance present activities,
* Local governments needs, by and large, ,further sources of revenue, the
~. ;-ability to vary the level of revenue, and flexibility to spend revenue.
~-
,\
From the review of international local government in development, attention
will tum to SA. It will be seen that SA local government is not as unique as
might be thought, and has many lessons to learn from international experience.
,\
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CHAPI'ER4.
South Africa: Toe Case of rdiddelburi_
This chapter will' examine the role of local government in SA, with particular
r~gard ~J}Middelburg, and the role it could play in future. The first five
sections are concerned with the Middelburg situation, while the last section is
concerned w1th the possibilities for the future.
, In this chapter themes of importance in prior chapters will be addressed. The
first section provides an overview of the town of Middelburg and its population
growth" while the second section examines the Middelburg economy, a key
determinant of the Council's financial viability. The third section deals with
the functions of local government in the SA, and Middelburg, context, echoing
I',
the concerns ofCflkpter 3 and the discussion of the functions of local
governments and small t~}In local governments internationally.' The fourth
,/ L,,, .. ' ,
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section examines mL;~){;,l,o:selythe state of Middelburg's finances, with a view
to assessing in broad terms the degree of manoeuvre for the future) while the
fifth section outlines the role of the central state in Middelburg. The final
section deals with the future, juxtaposing the view of the Council and an
alternative view which argues for greater autonomy, local accountability, and
community-based development on the psrt of the Council which will cater to
"
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, . '~, ~,/
the needs 'of the population to a greater degree than thus far has been the case.
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4.1 The Middelburg\'\::ontext.
\'. . .-
Middelbtlrg, a town in the near-Eastern i'ransvaal, forms the case study for the
examination of local government in SA. The questions to be addressed Include
the development possibilities of the town and surrounding areas, the role and
potential-role of the Council in such development, the question of state control
over the activities of t~rCouncil, the financial state of the Council and the
needs of the Council to play .~positive role in development in the future. The
relevance of the preceding chapters will be discussed throughout.
Middelburg is a small to medium sized town, with a population in 1985 of 44
76269. Urban population within jhe Mid\\elburg magisterial district was
estimated at 101 93570 by the Development Bank after adjusting for CSS
errors, That population is distributed between Middelburg, Rietkruil and
Hendrina. Middelburg satisfies Hardey and Satterthwaite's criteria" for a
small town as being a town with.less than 100 000 population, The population
of the town is growing rapidly, with African population growth estimated at
7,29% per year in the period between 1980 and 1985. This was urbanisation
69 Urban Foundation: Appendices to the report on Non-
Metropolitan Places. Unpublished mimeo, undated, p17.
70 These figures, and th~ figures below (unless other~ise
sp~cified) are drawn from Infraplan: ontwikkelingstrateqiet.
E£,sep Hoeveld striekdiensteraadgebied. Unpublished mimeo!
1990, pp37-42.
71 Hardoy f J and satterthwaite, D: "Why Small and
intermediate urban centres", op. cit.
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from the surrounding farming areas, however, as the African population of the
,
magisterial district grew by only 0,87% per annum in the same period. In the
'/
Ii
period since the census, and with the abolition of influx control population
growth has intensified dramatically, and Council officials report a three-fold
, increase in the African population of the town in the three years following the
abolitian of influx control. People came largely from Bophuthatswana, Lebowa
c>
and Kwandebele, Interestingly, this is from a small base, for Middelburg was
uncommonly "Whp,,\
II \1
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The evidence of population data, then, suggests that besides the historically
accumulated need for services Middelburg is experiencing a current need due
to the influx of population. Further, the fact that people are leaving the rural
hinterland suggests that their development needs are not being met, in tum
suggesting scope for the Council to playa role in wider development efforts.
4.2 The Middelburg Economy.t.
Economically, the town is dependant on the generation of electricity, with
almost 50% of the district GGP being derived from this source. ~ining
contributes another 30%, and the balance is spread between the other economic
sectors. Agriculture provides only 3% of the GOP, a share, as we shall. see,
that is not commensurate with its influence on employment in the area,
I I
Growth in the GGP is
displayed in Table .~'.below. It
is apparent that the sri'i\}ll
constraction sector and the
finance sector have experienced
the greatest growth since 1970,
closely followed by the far
larger electricity sector.
.Contributions to Middelburg GGn 1987
~~_~ Agriculture 3%
$erylces 4%
:riqure 1
Agriculture and manufacturing, the key sectors responsible for employment,
;t
are notable laggards.
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'fable 1: Contribution of economic sectors to GGP, 1970-87 (at 1985 prices)
(R '000)
1975
27035
4J840r
/368~46 809~22 .;r1046516 1390715
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The shift in contribution to GGP is reflected rrCFigure 2, when compared to
1970
Agriculture 30112
Mining 123521
Manufacturing 40250
Electricity 103443
Construction 4233
Trade 20280
Transport 8822
Finance 3712
Services 33973
Total
1980 1985 1987
45021
431196
69145
642508
29580
57569
20082
34014
61600
Figure 1. The share of electricity in GOP ",'as 26%, in 1970, compared to 46%
136782
51986
459246
25103
32952
14484
13394
42242
285494
65865
41378
423848
in 1987, mining remained relatively stable, while the shares of agriculture and
491018
25760
41478
20032
29766
67012
645685
32142
58440
20976
32360
44861 57641
1379482
manufacturing was considerably greater, 8% and 11% respectively in 1970
compared to 3% and 5% in
1987.
;,
The shift in the make-up of
GGP is obviously the effect of
the expansion of Escom in the
late 1970s and early 19808,
with the construction of the
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Contributions to Middelburg GGP 1970
Mlnlnll34%
AlirlClJ1 ture all'.
Services 9~~
Figure 2
(;\
Arnot, Hendrina, Duval and Kom<;\tistatiens. Growth possibilities from the
',\
activity is limited, given the mothballing of generation facilities currently
underway. Mining is closely related to electricity, with output going to Escom
plants and to the export market. The prevalence of both these sectors in the
local economy is problematic, since the leakage from the area is consequently
high. Bscom is centred in Sandton, while the mines are owned by Escom,
Iscor, and private sector mining groups. The development of 'he region is
limited by the outflux of capital, a point confirmed by the otherwise staid
Middelburg Town Clerk, who refers to the "rape" of the town by industry and
Bscom,
The major manufacturing company is Middelburg Steel and" Alloys, employing
9000 people. It is a highly capital intensive plant. Barlows Heavy Machinery
and Southern Cross make up the other large companies, while some 120 light
industrial enterprises comprise the rest of the industrial base, producing
products for the housing market such as burglar proofing and frame housing.
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Little is produced that is useful for the agricultural economy, and no further
processing of the products of MS&A takes place. The level of leakage is high,
with, for example, MS&P,\ supplying 700 companies around the country and
:J
none in Middelburg. MS&A distribution facilities. are placed in.the PWV, so it
is impossible to buy stainless st~l in the town.
The manufacturing sector has considerable scope for expansion, and is being
prioritised by the Town Council. The Council has recently established a
Marketing Department to attempt to attract business to the town, and sees ~he
expansion of industry as a major source of further development. Importantly,
, "~I
\ ~the expansion effort is aimed at attracting large companies to the area on the
basis of proximity to the PWV, available labour and infrastructure, and a 60%
benefit exposure in terms of the new industrial benefit allowances. A key
component is the further value adding of MS&A products. Over 400ha of
industrial land is being prepared for the expansion of the town's industrial
base. The development effort PlJts emphasis on competition with other towns,
and little effort is being made to promote the development of new local
enterprises, or to make services and infrastructure available for such
\\
enterprises. Little effort, too, is being made to promote the development of
companies that will produce for the local market, companies that will produce
basic consumer products, or companies that will produce products for use in
agriculture.
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Agric~lture, which makes a relatively small contribution to GGP, nevertheless
has an important place in the regional economy. The mix of agricultural c
products produced inMi9delburg is shown in Table 5 below.
-
Table 2: Contribution of Agricultural Products, 1983
(R '000) Middelburg Neigh- Midbg
bouring %
Districts Region
Arable products 27271 77917 35.0%
Maize 23482 43332 54.2%
Hay 2665 3690 72.2%
Other 1124 30895 3.6%
Horticultural Products 7222 18402 39.2%
Vegetables 6367 12163 52.3%
Other 855 6239 13.7%
Livestock Products 70263 95857 73.3%~
Beef 15451 24791 62.3%
Sheep 1208 3067 39.4%
Pigs 1527 4449 34.3%
Dairy '6655 lW65 60.1%
Poultry 44350 49215 90.1%
II
Other 1072 3270 32.8%
Total :104756 192176 54.5%-
Middelburg produces a wide range of products, including obscure items such
as ostrich feathers and karakul pelts. Predominantly however, as is evident
from the figures in Table 2 above, the district produces a range of staple,
items, being the major maize producer in the local area (Middelburg and the
surrounding magisterial districts of Groblersdal, Witbank, Belfast and
Waterval-Boven (thosearras that comprise sub-region 27». Indeed, it(lsthe'>",c. __
'\\,. ",'
major producer of arable crops, if the production of cotton and tobacco on
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irrigated land in the Groblersdal district q.'Jtoductionof RI9m per year) is
excluded from the total figures. It is also the largest producer oJ vegetables in
the area. In livestock products it is a centre of national importance, with,
considerable amounts of beef, dairy. products and poultry being produced.
Interestingly, little of these products are processed locally, but are exported
from the area for processing. Kanhym, for example, has one of the largest
feedlots in the country in, the Middelburg district, but actual processing takes
place in other centres. Beef, aleng with other agricultural products, is exported
,
from the area before being re-imported for the town. To summarise,
MiddelbYJ~,is a mixed, relatively productive area. in agricultural terms,() . "
producing-a'wide range of staple commodities, but with little local processing
D \,
activity.
The main players in agriculture are local farmers (who own farms of between
1 000 and 3 OOOha),processing companies (generally those that are part of
national groups) and co-operatives.
The Town Council has recently set up an-agricultural committee which will
look at the contribution that the town can make to the local rural economy, and
~
vice versa. Besides the Council officials, representatives of the District
Agricultural Union, the}.i~al Chamber of Business, and the Co-ops sit on the
committee. The Council is limited by statute as to the functions it may perform
in the area of supporting agricultural development. Partly as a result of this,
\\
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and because it is the ini~[al stages of looking at the question, little is planned
for future agricultural development at present.
The Council has little sympathy for informal sector business people. It has,
historically, prevented hawking", and at present limits hawking to a few
parking areas. Council officials explain this to be the result of the make-up of
the Council - most of the officials are business people. and are opposed to
competition in the form of hawking. The Council has contributed R350 000 to
the construction of a small business industry park. Rather obscurely, the park
was placed in Mhluzi, on the opposite side of town to the industrial area. It is
clearly meant to serve the township rather than to participate in the larger local
economy.
n Hart, OM and Rogerson, eM: IfHawkers in Soutll Africa's
small urban centres: Planning and Policy". DevelQ. ~ent
southern Africa, 6(3), Aug. 1989, p17. At the time the only
hawker's licences in issue where in the hands of "whites".
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Table 3: Performance Indices for Region F.
Impact of exogenous increase .of Rim in final demand on:
GGP: Rank Employ- Rank Employ- Rank
ment: ment/GGP
Agriculture 11.0 5 32.6 1 32.2 1
Mining 11.2 4 4.9 8 3.9 7
Manufacturing 9.5 8 8.5 6 6.9 6
Electricity 13.1 2 3.2 9 1.5 9
Construction 8.1 9 11.5 4 16.4 2
Trade 10.8 6 12.4 3";-,, 12.4 4~.~~, '
Transport 11.8 3 8.8 S', .7.4 5
Finance 14.3 '..l 1 5.1 7 3.1 8
Services 10.4 7 13.1 2 16.2 3
100.0 100.0 100.0
The make-up of the local economy, mentioned above, is deceptive in the sense
that the measure considered is limited to GGP. If one considers the
employment effects (Table 3) of expansion of economic activity a rather
different picture emerges. Electricity, while making a great contribution to
GGP, makes a minimal contribution to employment, as does finance, while the
opposite is true for agriculture, trade, services and construction. Agriculture
makes a contribution to employment 10 times the contribution of electricity,
and four times the contribution of manufacturing. This should also be seen in
the light of widespread leakage of GGP in the electricity and finance sectors,
while the. agricultural and construction sectors have considerably greater
linkages in the local economy, though there is leakage from national food
companies that are present in the area. The development path outlined by the
Council, focused on the expansion of industry, should be seen in the light of
these leakages and a massive problem of unemployment in the area • the
II
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unemployment rate in Mhluzi is estimated by the Township Administrator to
be 50%+.
It is clear from the above data that the development plans of the Council,
posited as they are on the expansion of large-seale industry and agriculture
under the contr9bQf large-scale farmers, are not meant to address the problem
of unemPIOyr(ent. ~~ey are underpinned by the notion of trickle-down of
'\
'\:\\
wealth from the wealthier sections of the community to poorer sections.
4.3 The Fittnctions of Local Government.
The functional activities of local governments are governed by a variety of
laws in SA. The Cape, OFS and Natal each have their own provincial
ordinances, which govern the activities of the local governments. In the area
closer to the present interest, the Transvaal, the activities of local governments
are regulated by the Local Government ordnance of 1939 (s79, of O. 17 of
1939). The activities of the black local authorities are governed by Black Local
Authorities Act of 1982 (523). One immediately notes a separation of the
legislation governing local authorities.
The situation is further complicated in that the activities of local authorities are
dictated by a myriad of laws of the respective central and provincial
governments. For example, the Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act
directs local authorities to perform certain health related functions, while the
j'
/1
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Minister of Health can. also direct that activities be performed (local authorities
are not ..compensated for these mandatory activities). Race adds new dimension
to the activities. Housing provides an example with housing related to the
white, "coloured", Indian and Africans each under the control of a different
institution and different Jaws. Local authorities also have a degree of discretion
as to which activities they may choose to perform, within the ambit of the
various legal parameters.
Thus the functions of local government are regulated regionally: provincially,
nationally and racially, and by the local authorities themselves. It goes without
saying, then, that it is difficult to extract a concise definition of the activities
of local authorities, and that each local authority will need to be examined in
order to ascertain its activities, and the effec~of those activities on the
community it should represent.
Nonetheless, there 1Sa measure of consistency in the activities qf the local
government. Typically, they offer services that have a protective, community
service or commercial orientation",
In the community service category Wecan include the provision ai~d
maintenance of streets, sidewalks and drainage systems, parks and ~f!creation
\'
73 Cloete, JJN: "The functional acti vities of locaJA
authorities". In: south African Local government and
administration, pretoria: van Schaik, 1989, pl13.
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grounds, and health serv~ies. In the category of protective services we can
{'
f iI
include services such as traffic control, civil defence, municipal police forces,
and licensing activities, while the provision of services such as a municipal
abattoir and the supply of water, electricity and refuse removalis typically
provided on a commercial basis.
II
\)
Such a conceptualisation does not, however, advance beyond the point of
o ,
providing a rudimentary categorisation of services. Xt does not say anything of
the effectiveness oHthe services that are provided, or the. role that local
\'. . - - - ()
authorities can playas a. development agency for their communities,
,.;:
1."1 order to assess the effectiveness of local government, is necessary to first
define the quantitative and qualitative need for services that exists in
communities, the accessability of those services that do, exist, and the
<::.~::-:~\
affordability of those services. In a sense, we need to assess the demand for
services relative to the supply Qf services in order to judge the effectiveness of
" 1\
a local government in serving its community.
Judging the need, provision, accessability and affordability of services is a task
requiring great resources. It may be fairly assumed, however, that there is a
dire need for urban services and services appropriate to the rural populations
of the country. In the Middelburg case, for example, This can be illustrated
with anecdotal evidence. In the first instance extensive migration to the town
from ~nJ~cent rural areas has taken place over the last few years. This
indicates a lack of development opportunities in the rural hruterlanos.
c,
Secondly, the presence of squatters indicates a lack of urban facilil~es.
In the racially structured, unequal and highly politicised South A~~can service
Ii
context, the skewed distribution of services adds a further dimensi:on, in that
the availability of services for industry and upper and middle classes arouses
:1
the opposition of thosefj~xCluded. Certainly. this has happened in ~!liddelburg,
n '
as the rent and serviC# charge boycotts have revolved around inadequate,
/--, 1:
inferior and expensive services. 11
o i
In Middelburg, the Council confines itself to providing urban se~1cesto the
o ~
"white" areas, and the business districts. Services include the pr;J.j~sion M
I
library facilities, fire services, health services, parks, as well as ul'lilittes. A
1\
I
feeding scheme is rum for the poorer white residents of the town. iNo services
r, Il', I,
are provided for the residents of the township. 1\
1\
il
II
There is a case to be made that the provision of adequate services t depriV,
communities is a necessary condition for economic growth. A degr~~~o~56~ial
l\
peace is necessary for economic activity to take place. One -the oth~~\hand, as
noted above, economic growth is widely considered to be an essenti4
~ \
requirement if the degs;~tion of services and infrastructure, a tragifY
common occurrence in the developing context, is to be avoided. \
1,
\~
~.,
~
~
\
1\
~
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4.4 Middelburg's FinaD~r,s.
( ;
In the following pages the state G!J,~J.nanceof the J.flddelburg Town Council
shall be reviewed. At the outset, it should be noted that the tinf;nces of the
Council being reviewed are those of the "white" Town Council.
The BLA of the town, Mhluzi, does not have appropriate ~~ords available for
examination. By all accounts the authority is bankrupt, as a result of a rent and
service charge boycott and a lack of business and industrial centres, unable to
generate considerable amounts of income. Acclording to the Administrator of
the township", it is dependant on the province and the R.SCfor'i'kx:urrent
income and expenditure of R195 000 per month. The Administrator has cut
salaries by 40%, and retrenched staff. The Council is able to maintain basic
services, but has stt~pende.dthe repayment of loans. Somewhat ironically, this
is occurring while considerable devet ~ent for middle and upper-income
, ( ':0
people is being implemented - some 16 houses pel! week are being completed,
in the R25 000 - R40 000 price range, under the auspices of the SART. The
administrator argues that new sources of finance will have to be found, while
government assistance will have t.;) continue and be increased in the interim.
74 Interview with Pieter Colin, recently retired town
Clerk of Middelburg and current Administrator of Mhluzi.
Ii
The "coloured" and "Indian"
areas, Nasaret and Eastdene
respectively, are administered
by Middelburg, and are also
unable to generate income
sufficient for their needs -
in 1989, (,',$ shown in table 4
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Eastdene arid Nasarei
Income and expenditure 1989
2<100 ,
1GOO .
~igure 3
below and Figure 3, both
townships ~ere; itt deficit, to the total sum of R319 000. The deficit was borne
l;ly Middelburg,
Table 4: Eastdene and Naseret Income and Expenditure 1989
Income Expend. Deficit
R '000 R '000 R '000
Bastdene 9G4.4 1062.'7 -128.3
Nasaret 766.9 957.7 -190.8
I Total 1701.3 2020.4 -319.1
",--
Middelburg, then, is the pivotal Source of finance for the Middelburg complex
as a whole. The development of the town is predicated on the financial $tabiiity
of the "white" Middelburg - the Industrial areas, the CBD and the upper-
income residential suburbs.
Middelbur~(had income of R46
976 000 in 1990 (1989 R39
704 000) (see Tables 5 and 6,
p87). The bulk of this income
was derived from the trading
services.of the Council.
Electricity was by far the most
\\
important component;'
MiddelbuM Sources of Income~ig90
Nort-Trading Services 12%c\
Subsidies 2%
Other 4%•
TradIng lncorne 71%
Figure 4
"',
accounting for over 50% of the Council income. Rates accounted for 12%, as
did other services of the Council (libraries, cemeteries, the traffic department,
etc). Subsidies from higher levels of government accounted for only 3,6%
(19894%). Oilier sources of income were of relatively minot importance •..
r . ~
While the make-u~ of the Council income remained app~oximately stable, the
r
inco..me rose considera bly in the year to 1990. As shown in .lfab1e 6, the
; '\<i'- r __ 1
Council income rose by 18%, on average (this compares v./ith the Department
of Finance's suggested maximum increase of 13%). Middelburg justifies this
by pointing to the expansion of the town.
87
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Table 5: Middelburg Income 19897s•
Rates
Non-Trading Services
Trading Income
Refuse
Sewerage
Electricity
Water
Other
Subsidies
I Total
R '000
882.4
2172.2
20075.2
5524;7
% R '000
4576.9
4682.2
28654A
2.2%
5.5%
50.6%
13.9%
240.6
1549.8
39704.0
%
11.5%
11.8%
72.2%
0,.6%
4.0%
100.0%
Table 6: l\f.iddelblJr~ Ineeme 19907.,
R '000 % R '000
Rates
Non-Trading Services
Trading Income
Refuse
Sewerage
Electricity
Water
Other
Subsidies
Total
1094.5
250M
23335.2
,6207.7
'\
33146.S
2.3%
5.3%
49.7%
13.2%
902.2
1654.3
46916.3
%(; %
change
1989··
1990
11.9% 22.0%
12.1% 21.5%
70.6% 15.7%
24,0%
15.5%
16.2%
12.4%
63.0%
12.8%
18.3%
2.0%
3.6%
1(}0.0%
The figures above distort the income pattern somewhat, If one examines
Middelburg net income (ir,come after expenses of providing services) (see
Table 7), then it is clear that the bulk of the services which the Council
provides are loss-making. These services (clinics, library, public works etc)
75 sources Middelburg TOwllCouncil: Fina.ncial statements
1989. Unpublished.
76 Source: Middel:burg TownCouncil: Fina.ncial sta't:ements
199~~. unpublished.
subsidies. Interestingly, the mix Figure 5
are primarily of a social nature.
The services provide a useful
14,1% (see Figure 5) of
revenuyt"Gut they are
j
If
nevertheless supported by only
three sources of net income -
rates, trading services. and
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Mlddelburg Net Income 1990.
of income changes considerably - rates are. now the most important contributor
,
1\:
to Council finances, providing 48 % of net income of the proflillble activities of
(i
the Counril (prpviding only 12% of revenue), while tradipg services provide
only 38% (against 71% of reve~~e in 1990). Subsidies too ate of considerably
more importance, being responsible for 14% of net Income against the,4% of
revenue. As regards the utilities and rates, while no figures are avrulable,
Council officials are of the opinion that the industrial sector (particularly
MS&A) and,,the CBD provides the bulk of income.
Table 7: Middelburg Net Income 19!1)077.
R '000 % of net R '000
income
Rates
Non-Trading Services
Tradihg Income
Refuse
Sewerage
Electricity
Water
Other
Subsidies
Total
5567.2
-9875.7
4372.9
-108.1
320.9
3072.S
1087.7
-0.9%
2.8%
26.5%
9.4%
% of
net in-
come
48.;0%
37.7%
14.3%
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In the area of capital
expenditure Middelburg is
overwhelmingly dependant on
external sources of finance. In
1990 some 26% (198928%) of
r:'i
capital borrowed was from
internal sources, and the
balance from external, .;
. ~,
0.0
1654.3
171-8.8
Middelburg Sources of Capital 1990.
Figure 6
The internal capital came in large part from the Land Trust Fund and the
Township Suspense Account (with outstanding balances of Rl,5m and R5,5m
1\
respectively), which are in turn financed by the development and sale of land
77 Middelburg Financial Statements, 1990.
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owned by the Council", and accumulated provisions and reserves (R4,lm
balance), financed over the years by the Council itself. Other accounts such as
the Community Facilities Fund and the Community Development Fund made
minor contributions.
As shown in Table 8 the majority of the external capital came from loans in
the form of stocks, with a small amount from annuities. The funds from stocks
are placed in the Consolidated Loans Fund, and not tied to particular projects
which the Council is undertaking. These stocks are placed with pension funds
and assurance companies, for periods ranging from a year to 25 years, the
period depending on the interest payable, at rates which are approximately
0.25 % higher than that payable on bell-weather Escom stocks. The Council
estimates it can currently obtain capital at 17%. In other words, the authority
has good financial standing, and has access to capital markets at reasonable
cost in relation to the general cost of capital.
Table 8: Mi.ddelburg External Obligations.
1989 Change 1990
R '000 R '000 R '000
Loans 31133.6 4789.0 35922.7
Stocks 29541.0 5000.0 34541.0
Annuities 1592.6 -211.0 1381.6
Internal 11849.2 832.2 12681.4
7& Middelburg Council is the major developer in the town. The council
maintains a works department which develops land, putting in utilities and
roads, before selling the land off at a cost which ranges from RIO to R25 per
square meter. Land which is undeveloped (a considerable amount since the
council owns over 16 OOCha.) is afforested or leased to neighbouring farmers.
A mere comprehensive picture of the financial standing of the town is to be
seen in table 9 below. Of the R116m79 invested in the facilities. of the town
(at historical costs), R48m is financed by leans from external sources or from
internal funds, with R33m having been financed by loans which have
subsequently been repaid. Other items form a lesser but not hi!!onsiderable
contribution to the financing and financial position of the town.
'fable 9: Mi.ddelburg Abridged Balance Sheet
1989 1990
Loans Outstanding.
Loans Redeemed
Capital Develepm~~n~.;Pund
Trust Funds
Provisions and Reserves
Unappropriated Surplus
Other
R'OOO R '000
44615.2 48366.6
25654.9 33231.5
3626.3 4712.1
26453.0 30045.2
4317.4 4142.6
5273.9 6457.1
8070.7 11284.9
118011.5 138240.1
r--....-------------~-- ...- .......--------- ..-- ..-u--- ......----...---------.-------.--Capital Outlay 97820.9 116166.7
Investments 3443.2 4548.3
Cash 2.2 2.1
Creditors 13977.2 14333.6
Other 2768.0 3189.4
118011.5 138240.1
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To summarise the financial position of Middelburg, the Council is clearly in a
healthy financial position, being self-financing to a considerable extent, able to
secure capital at costs which are reasonable Anrelation to the wider cost of
79 The figure is understated, since R5m of short-term assets are financed
off the balance sheet by leasing.,
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capital, and possessing considerable accumulated reserves and assets in the
form of land that will enable it to finance itself in the future. State subsidies,
\\
while being a valuable source of income, are not essential to the operations or
viability of the Council. The problem, obviously, is that the accounts exclude
Mhluzi, and in so doing exclude the overwhelming majority of the town ts
population, and those most in need of the Council's development efforts.
4.5 State Influence and ContrOl.
// . '~~~,\
Besides those forms! of control mentioned under functions of the Council, state
control and influence Olverthe activities of the Council exists in several areas.
* By-laws of the Council have to be approved by the administrator.
* Centrally, the forms df~evenue collection· that the local authQrity may
engage in is limited by statute, essentially to rates and fees for services
rendered. As the Council retails utilities bought in bulk, it may charge a
surplus on the cost and use the proceeds for Council funds.
, .... ,=; ...•
* The Council obtains a fair proportion of its capital expenditure from
the land held in the Land Trust Fund, transactions in which need the
permission of the administrator of the Transvaal. The Administrator's
permission is also needed for the raising of capital on the markets.
* The Council is required to maintain a Capital Development Fund, and.
a Consolidated Loans Fund, and is required to devote 1% of its
recurrent income to the former.
<)
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* The Department of Finance provides a 13% limit on the annual
increase in Council income and expenditure, although the limit is
variable in practice. Middelburg has had no problem in increasing both
income and expenditure by 20% in each of the last two years.
* State bodies subsidise Council services", with firefighting equipment
subsidised by 45%, ambulances in full, health expenditure to the extent
of a third of total costs, and infectious diseases seven eighths.
Anachronistically, a subsidy of R12 008 is received for roads, although
the cost of sealing roads approaches R250 000 per kilometre and
Middelburg has 40km of roads under its control.
* Various state departments are empowered to order the Council to
perform functions.
The Council reports cordial relations with the state and the bodies that exercise
influence over local government, no doubt due in no small measure to the
prominence of the recently retired Town Clerk, Pieter Colin, a,. former
President of the Institute of Town Clerks, and present Director of the
Gazankulu Development Corporation, Administrator of Mhluzi and Marketing
Director of the. Council. In discussing state structures which exercise influence
over Middelburg he talks with an obvious air of personal experience of and
80 Figures extracted from the annual financial statements have been
adjusted to take into account inconsistencies in the treatment of items. For
example, included amongst the record of government subsidies is an amount of
R383 000 which is the rates paid by the government on land owned in
Middelburg. This amount has been deducted from subsidies and added to the
income from rates,
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ease and familiarity with central and provincial officials responsible for local
government.
The keys area of state control of Middelburg, then, is control of the forms of
revenue collection that the Council may engage in. control of transactions in
capiW assets and liabilities, and. approval of by-laws that the Council passes.
\,
\
4.6 POSl~ibilitiesfor the Future.
\
\,
4.6.~ The Official's View.
\
Councils offict;\us express great fear for the future. While a key determinant of
their actions is their obligation to "obey the law", they see the future of
Middelburg as a separated one, one in which the Council will remain
concerned with the "white" town, while providing expertise for.the other
areas. A great concern, and something to be avoided, is the impact of "third
world" standards on the town. Essentially their objective, stated explicitly, is
the retention of separate administrations for the spatial entities that are
Middelburg and Mhluzi, while conceding that there might be a IIgreying" of
Middelburg itself by wealthier.township residents (this is qualified by noting
the probable hostile response of present residents. Council officials do not
expect many people to move from the township to "white" Middelburg).
96
In development the C;,(jllJncil.sees its main task as the provision of infrastructure
that will allow for development - the provision of adequate schools (the
Council has started a fund to provide the capacity for the development and
maintenance of schools in the event of the central and provincial states not
having sufficient funds), utilities and other services.
l',\
The development mode being pursued is one that is predicated on the
expansion and attraction of large-scale industry ;;'Council officials see no need
to address the question of the relationship of the town to surrounding areas, or
to question the relationship between the town ~d its inhabitants, perhaps
because the developm~rt path of the town has the status of 'common-sense' -
l'
Council officials are d1:awn into the central state's conceptions of economic
development and the policies through which such development can be attained.
Middelburg has several factors which promote the development of industry in
the town. Amongst them are:
* tlje location f~ relation to the PWV,
]I
* the presence lpf industry-in the town and the possibility of economies
of agglomeration for companies complementary to the main industries,
* the presence
* the location transport routes, Ii
I'
i
* the presence of a vast pool of unemployed, relatively unskilled
labour.
Nevertheless, as noted from table 1, (P74) the town does not have a history of
rapid industrial growth, with the last major expansion .dating from the
establishment of MS&A in the mid-1960s. In the period since growth has
depended on the expansion of the electricity sector and other economic activity
with high leakage from the area, with minimal employment effect for labour
/;.;;:/
(;Forofficials then, development is difficult to separate from economic growth,
il=:aria~ geared to the development of large scale industry with the benefits of
such development dispersed through a process of employment creation anq
trickle-down of wealth. Crucially, the feasibility of such a process is not
questioned. Nor does the Council question precisely who will benefit from
such a process.
It seems likely, however, that such a development path is a recipe for the
retention of the status quo, in terms of the distribution of wealth and
opportunity, ie a situation in which the "White" citizens, large business and
those Working for large companies or in skilled positions in the state (nurses,
and policemen) will benefit while others (probably the majority) will receive
minimal assistance or benefit from programmes geared to meeting their needs.
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The role the Council plays and intends to play in Middelburg accords cwi~ that
prescribed by Ule neo-classical role of local government, discu~~oo in Chapter
2. The role of the Council is simply centred around the provision of goods that
the market will not produce in the desired amount due t9 the presence of
economies external to private decision making. The goods are nevertheless
needed. The; role of the Council, then, is to intervene in the market to provide
these goods and services, as the Council has thus far been doing.
In the-case of Middelburg this means the provision of services and
infrastructure to the wealthier residents and the industrial and business
districts, .with the relatively deprived communities of Mhluzi, Bastdene and
Naseret excluded from the bulk of resource use, and, in the racially separated
South African context, institutionally separate. As such it is subject to the same
,,' criticisms as the neo-classical theory which informs it.
Tho lH:;cipline to WhiCR) the Council is subject, the prospect of the rate-paying
citizens of the town moving to other areas if they are dissatisfied\vith the
services qf the Council, reveals that the neo-classical tradition is predicated on
the ownersqfp of'property. The Council, with its conscious preoccupation with
" /i
the right'~f property owners and the economy, takes no account of the
circumstances in whicb many people find themselves struggling.
" . I, I /,
The theory does point to where social power lies in the town, and why, but
\\
does not offer hope ~pr the development of the town as anything other than-a
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town geared toward the interests of those propertied, both those who live In
the town and tf.ose active in the town but centred elsewhere. Neo-classicalu
theory outlines a future that is elite-based and fundamentally undemocratic,
To summarise thus far, the Council's development path indicates a local
)government development role that is alienated from the locality and its
particular dynamics, rooted rather in the national political economy and serving
those who are full participants in, and beneficiaries of, that political economy.
Those peripheral to that economy will pick up the crumbs that trickle down in
employment effects.
4.6.1.2 Financial Consorns
Financially, a concern of\officiaIs is the need for new sources of finance, the
key requirements (as put forward by the assistant-ereasurer) being a form of
c· (
finance in which everybody is taxed. The present sources of finance are not
considered to be sufficient for the future - officials point to a rate-payer revolt
as the key constraint. One possibility mentioned is greater access to R.SC
finances, or access to an indirect tax such as VAT. Underlying their concern
for new sou~ces of finance is the need to provide services for those presently
: \\
without, 2U1d reluctance or inability to bear the costs of such services. Officials
point to the +-35 000 squatters present in the town ~~d the Council's inability
to finance the cost of services for those people. Their 'concern, while rooted in
(I
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the self-interest of those from whom the Council draws its revenue, appears
valid.
4.6.2 An Alternative View
4.6.2.1 Development Path.
This paper has put forward the view (see Chapter 2) that local government is a
set of institutions that reflect a wide variety of social forces that exist in the
local sphere. These forces reflect a wide range of social groups, international,
national and Iocal' in dimension, including those peripheralised in the wider
society. A Council acts as both an intermediary body, reflecting the outlooks
ii i'
i,i
and priorities of the social interests present, and a representative boq:y,
I!
drawing'a mandate from and reflecting the views of the local population on
whom it is based. Often the two roles of a Council may be in conflict, and
even contradictory, when the demands of a Council's constituents conflict with
i
those of the larger social forces reflecting national and even international
demands and desires.
If this paradigm is applied to Middelburg, it clearly falls short. Middelburg.
does not reflect the aspirations of the majority of the population. It is not a
representative body, being racially segregated. In a real sense, Middelburg has
functioned as a transmission belt, reflecting the interests of that section of the
town drawn into and benefitting from the national economy, Its intermediary
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ful~ctions have been dominant, and Middelburg has been dominated by a
particular concept of nation (the "white nation 11) and economy.
- ',!
~rVieWed another way, the theory has some validity. The very' fact that the
//
town has endured such turmoil over the last few years points to its
shortcomings as a representative body, and the antagonism between the
interests of those excluded from the town and the interests of dominant social
fo~ces. The population of Middelburg has not been well served by those
,
eniFrprises that have established themselves in the town, by the development of
I'
th~l·electricity t finance and large manufacturing sectors, and the neglect of the
i
ag~dcultU'i!'ll,small industrial and construction sectors. They have not been well
J:
se~red by the deliberate stifling and channelling of economic activity, by the
Cq~ncil amongst others. In other words, the Council has not responded to the.
l!
lo~~ conditions pertaining in the town, but has responded to the conditions
:1 . .
I
u
pe~~ning for a section of the population and the national forces.
r ~
n
ii
:1
Ii
Thl~Council, it is suggested above, has had and continues to have a rather
orthodox view of its role, It is suggested that it is trapped in a neo-classical
'I
ii
viej~(of the role of the Council, and continues to have such a view, in that it is
Ii (
i'
matginallsing the majority of the inhabitants from the future development of
!,
\
the 'Itown.Such a path is rejected in the section above.
n
Ii
:j
i'
~ ~
I -'·)1 0
!; '_",_ //
The\irejection is, seen another way, a reje~i~ ..t~f a development path that i!~
1\
'I. u
cent~ed arb~?d the fun,,1ltionsof the Council, The Council sees its role as
()
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providing services neglected by the market to its present constituents. In doing
this it, firstly, does not remove itself from its uniopresentative foundation, and,
secondly, precludes the question of whether Middelburg is being, and can in
the future be shaped by social bargaining. In the past of an apartheid
if
dominated country with the majority of the population subjugated by co-optibn
and coercion, perhaps such a view held some validity at points. Certainly this
is not true of the present, and is hopefully not true of the future.
Th4~ly, and perhaps most importantly, the Council negates the fact that the
role and functions of local government varies very greatly between different
parts of the world while sharing certain common features". To define the
role of local government simply by its functions detracts from its nature as an
institution that is flexible in the extreme, that can respond to the particular
level of development and economic conditions that is evidenced in its
jurisdiction, while being shaped by local actors, including those marginalised
in wider society.
An alternative mode of development may be related to local conditions. Earlier
in this Chapter reference was made to the extensive migration to the town, the
~roblem of an agriculture dominated by large scale farmers, the un&ploymel1t
present in the town, and the lack of services. Problems such as these naturally
I)
go along with a problem of the effects of institutionalised racism and gender
81 See Section 3.2.
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discrimination. It is towards the resolution of problems such as these that the
development efforts of the Council should be focused.
As has been noted (see the discussion starting on p45 for more detail)
international experience indicates'<that the development of smaller towns is
enhanced with policies that will encourage the development of linkages within
and between the smaller town and its hinterland. Further, while industry,
especially that based on agricultural processing, can form a valuable
contribution to the economic development of such a town, agriculture itself has
a crucial role to play, especially in t4~context of land reform programmes in
the rural hinterland. The adoption of such programmes lead to a fundamental
restructuring of the functions that the town performs, potentially to the benefit
of the mass of inhabitaa.s. This raises the ways in which the policies of the
Council act as a key influence on such restructuring. As noted in Ganapathy's
<} . ,>~,
review" of the functions of smaller towns, the local Council can promote the
development of the town by prompting development as a market centre that
".
will service hinterlands and other towns in the area, promote small industry
82 Ganapathy, RS,: "Spatial development, small towns and public policy:
the Indian experience", op cit; Hardey, J and Satterthwaite, D: uA survey of
empirical material on the factors affecting the development 'Ofsmall and
intermediate urban centres", op cit; Rondinnelli, D: "Small towns in
developing countri)ps: Potential centres of growth, transformation and
integration", op cit.
83 ('~qkalpathY,RS,: "~P:iltial development, small towns and public policy:
the Indial) experience", op cit.
~
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that will provide locally useful products, agro-processing, and small enterprise.
For Middelburg consideration of such policies is noticeably absent.
4.6.2.2 Instltutlonal Capacity and Constraints.
International experience discussed in Chapter 3 indicates" that a key problem
standing in the way of local government functioning as development
institutions is capacity. Councils are short of staff of sufficient skill, lack
finance and do not have the means and authority to raise additional finance.
The Middelburg Council indeed bas considerable institutional capacity. It is
well equipped with staff, containing a range of planning, engineering and
financial Skips. Council officials agree they are well equipped to utilise their
skills beyond the "white" town.
4.6.2.3 Financial Constraints
The key shortcoming, however, is financial. Several questions emerge and
remain unanswered - what will be the sources of recurrent revenue for the
CouncUI, what will be the sources of capital for development efforts, whether
84 See ..Chapter 3.
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in the arena of equipping the town's community with services or developing
the town's economy more generally.
An immediate point that emerges is that the town's practices of capital
procurement are fairly staid. Bonds of a standard nature are issued, with term
dependant largely on cost. This can be juxtaposed to practices in America,
where a large variety of bonds are issued, tailored to meeting the needs of
Councils. It is now common cause that the South African capital markets are
limited by the state and the reluctance of lenders to invest in areas other than
established companies. With the opening up of capital markets one may expect
the availability of financing to increase, and the forms of finance to diversify
as a more complex array of risk/reward profiles become attractive.
The municipal financing options below", which serve to illustrate the range
of instruments potentially available to local government, can also be
complemented by various call and put options, whereby the local authority can
repurchase the bond and the investor can sell the debt back to the authority.
This helps to create a market for the debt and-lowers interest charges. Small
local authorities frequently band together to form a financing authority to gain
85 Hamilton, R: "The world turned upside down: The contemporary
revolution in state and local government financing", In: Carr, Jed. Cri~isand
constraint in municipal financing. Rutgers: The Centre for Urban Policy
Research, 1984, pp202~219.
(,
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access to markets which require size in order for an issue to be liquid. This
further reduces financing costs.
Instrument
Zero Coupon
Bonds
Compound Inter-
est Bonds
Stepped Coupon
Bonds.
Tender Option
(Put) Bonds.
Super Sinker
Bonds,
Floating Rate
Bonds
Features
Pay no interest but sell far below
par.
Sell at ~acevalue, interest
compounded aver the life of the
bond and payed at redemption.
Serial bonds (redemption stag-
gered over a number of years)
with the bonds sold at pat:':and
interest rates "stepped up" for
each year that the bond is in
issue.
The bond-holder baS the right to
redeem the bond on specific dates
before redemption.
Issuing agency is required to use
surplus funds to redeem bonds
early at face value. Bonds are
redeemed by lottery. Typically
used when the bond proceeds are
being used to finance mortgages.
If the mortgages ere redeemed
early the funds are used to redeem
the associated bonds.
Interest rates are tied to rates in
the economy.
Gains for
Investor
Tax free capital
gains
Tax free capital
gain. return is
known.
Protection of
capital, interest
increases over
time
compensating for
inflation.
Bond-holder has
flexibility and
higher interest
rates than a short
term bond.
Secured bond.
Higher interest
rates for a bond
of long maturity.
Less chance of
erosion of
principal.
Gair:ll for Council
No interest payments, but
greater redemption payment.
No interest payments; but
greater redemption payments.
Easier compliance with lending
limits.
Lower interest costs.
Lower interest costs (1 % less
than similar maturity bonds).
Greater interest costs than
short term bonds if the PUlt
ol'tio~ is exercised. :i~,.
Lower interest rates (3/4% less
than bonds of similar
maturity). Redemptions tied. to
Income generating assets.
Lower interest rates (Up to 3%
1e5:S).Uncertain interest
pal,'ments.
Detachable
Warrant Bonds.
Tax Exempt
Commercial
Paper
Tax Exempt
Leveraged Lease
Financing.
Tax Exempt
Demand Master
Notes.
Bondholders have the rigbt to buy
further bonds in a specified
period.
Short term (maturity less than 270
days), unsecured promissory notes
backed by a line of credit.
A public sector financing agency
loans the receipts of a bond issue
to a private sector consortium to
buy a public facility. The facility
is then leased back to the local
government, which pays the
consortium a lease fee. The lease
secures the loan. which in tum
secures the bond issue. Various
forms of protection can be' built in
to ensure tha~control of the faci-
lity remans with the local auth-
ority. The sale price can be used
for capital developments.
Notes are sold to institutional
investors who can demand repay-
ment after a notice period. A line
of credit backs the notes. Interest
is floating.
~~por1tunityto
buy po!udsat a
cheap~~rate if
interest'~tes
fall. "
Tax exempt,
short term
investment
Tax exempt
rental income.
Flexible. short
term tax exempt
investment.
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Lower interest payments (11-
2%)., Savings or losses depend-
ing on-the trend in interest
rates.
Lower interest costs (up to a
third of the cost of conven-
tional bonds), greater flexi-
bility. access to a large pool of
funds.
Low financing costs (2% lower
than conventional financing).
Low interest (40 % below
prevailing rates).
The measures and instruments outlined above offer flexibility in meeting the
capital requirements of local authorities, A greater matching of the financing
requirements and instruments available can contribute substantially to a
reduction in financing cost. The savings from such measures are magnified in
situations of high interest rates due to the compounding effect,
The value of such measures is enhanced in the local context as in'pn unstable ~/'
1\ /y
economic climate borrowers are reluctant to be trapped into Iong-term high /
interest charges, while renders are similarly reluctant because of inflation, tax
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changes and volatile interest rates. "Creative financing" JI a term that for some
is pejorative, has resulted in various attempts to marry the needs of lenders and
borrowers ...These attempts are subject to constraints of political acceptability,
technical ability to manage complex transactions, and the law.
In the South African context the key constraint to the search for innovative
financing techniques would appear to be political acceptability. As Solomon
points out" internal financing has few cost advantages over external
financing, and is pursued by local governments due to ignorance and
conservatism, political phenomena related to central government reluctance to
see local authorities incur debt. His conclusion is that local governments forego
development opportunities in favour of fiscal conservatism.
Additional recurrent finance is clearly needed. As already noted (P66) from (i
international experience" it cannot be assumed that the service charge
boycotts are capable of easy resolution, for community reluctance to pay local
government taxes is a phenomena that occurs in many developing nations and
is rooted in perceptions that local government services are a good that should
be available according to n~d, and upon which poorer communities should not
,Ii'
86 Solomon, D: The economic and financialpoIicies.of local g_ovemments
in South Africa. Unpublished MA dissertation, UCTt 1983, pp128-130.,
87 Cochrane, G: Policies for strengthening Local government in developing
,countries. World Bank Staff Working: Papers, No. 582. Washington: World
11J3ank,1983; Mawhood, P: "Decentralisation, the concept and the practice". In
IMawhood~P, ed, Local Govemment in the third world. Chichester: John
Wiley, 1983a.
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have to spend income. Nevertheless, South Africa's fi.rtincing -capacity is
substantially higher than many other countries in the developing world.
Substantial scope to increase revenue exists, in the form of increased service
charges, rates, access to other forms of tl!.lance and access to revenue of other
«(
levels of government.
To illustrate, there seems no obvious ~eason why Middelburg's 5,7 % markup
on electricity sales cannot be increased substantially. As already noted
electricity provides 50% of Middelhurg's revenue, and 27fo of net income
Ii
(P88). A 22,8% mark-up would increase the unit (lost of electricity to l lc, an
increase of 14% in the fitial cost of electricity, and increase the Council
revenue by approximately 150% and income by 7$%88,
Rates in Middelburg are presently set at 6,36c per rand of unimproved value.
The Council has the capacity to increase the rate, land again there seems to be
no clear reason why this cannot be done.
Governrneht revenue at other levels could also be an important source of new
finance. South Africa is not exempt from the tendency, noted above (p66), for
higher levels of government to retain taxes that are administratively and
politically easy to collect. In the South African context local government has
88 Calculated with figures from the Middelburg Financial Statements, 1989,
p34.
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D.O share of taxes which use business enterprises ~s collection agencies; for
example, and have no power to impose such taxes.
4.7 Conclusion"
It is apparent that the town of Middelburg is dependant on the "white" town,
industrial and commercial districts for the revenue with which to provide
services, In particular, it is dependant on rates, service charges, and to a lesser
extent, subsidies, for revenue. For capital expenditure it ~sdependant on the
n
\~~\
capital markets. In general the finances of the !OWh, as it is presently
constituted (ie as the "white" town) are in a healthy state. The town also
enjoys good relations with the state, despjte a range of restrictions on its
activity which limit the deve!~,pment effort of which it is capable.
The town is economically dependant on the electricity-and mining ser:"9rs for
its welfare. These sectors, the control of which lies outside the town and the
region; ;;..r; not likely to grow in the future. They also provide minimal
employment, notwithstanding their contribution to GGP. The area is dependant
on the agricultural and manufacturing sectors for employment creation.
Middelburg is an important agricultural district in the region, and in some
areas in the nation.
The Town Council is focusing on the expansion of the large-scale
manufacturing sector for its future development. It is depending on its position
o" If, Ii
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relative to toe PWV to draw industry, and the existing presence of a ~~wlarge
\\
\~~
factories. The Council sees its role as maintaining the development of
_ ../ '/'
,---,_,--,"-;::>
infrastructure tQ facilitate such development. Council officials are wary of
development paths that ate orientated more towards the needs of majority of
the community. Offid\als fear the effect of "third world" standards on the
)J (/1/
town.
Yet Middelburg has not shown substantial industrial growth sipce the mid-
19605, and the. wisdom of the development path outlined can be questioned. It
is clear that the development path outlined is likely to favour those presently
skilled and part of the political process of the town.
The Council would appear to be limited by a remaining empathy with' ,
1\
apartheid, and the restrictions of neo-classical thought which dictates a limited
role for the Council, and a role that is elitist and undemocratic,
The scope for a greater local government role is available, however. If the
local government were to dislocate itself from its present constituents and be
I,
representative, rooting itself in the locality and the problems of unemployment
and population growth, 'a range of activities open up,
International evidence suggests that small town growth is promoted with
policies that are focused on the region in which the .town is situated, and
sectors in which labour intensity is high. Agriculture and agro-processing, in
I)
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particular, make a great contribution to development, particularly in association
with policies of land reform and redistribution. Such development is more
egalitarian.
In the case of Middelburg the Council can playa valuable role in re-orientating
the town to facilitate -such development.
'lI,
The Council has a valuable skill base which can be utilised for the
d.\fvelopmetlt of the town. These include planning, engineering and financial
i
skills. The Council '~~,however, consirained by inadequate revenue at present.
Substantial scope exists to increase revenue from the present sources of
')
finance. Additional revenue sources are also necessary, but the Council is
constrained by Cel1tral state, legislation which limits the forms of revenue
collection it can engage in. it also does not have access to easily collected
r,
,_i¥~'(
forms of revenue, which are (mder the control of the central'state. While it can
increase its revenue from its present sources, Middelburg needs additional
". \1I_i ,. '
c
sources of revenue, and levenue ~hat is easily collected.
(J
I)
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CHAPTERS.
/1
Conclusion.
Several views of the role of local government examined in this document
indicate that local government is predominant~y concerned with the provision
of social services. The neo-classical tradition asserts that local government
intert1enes in the economy in order to adjust the allocation of resources for
market failure. Alternatively, in a neo-weberian outlook, the local state
intervenes in the process of consumption in order to cater to socially defined
needs of the community. Cockburn's arlalysis is similar, for local government
intervenes to ensure services necessary for social reproduction are available.
In such analysis local government is subordinate to the national government.
For Duncan and Goodwin local government is conjunctural, the result of a
wide variety of social forces, both national and local in nature. Local
government fulfils both an interpretive role and a representative role. It
interprets the demands of competing social forces, international, national,
regional and local in nature, while also representing and drawing its legitimacy
from its constituents. Local government, wh. J dominated by national
government and national economic forces has the capacity to influence the
'~,:._/
locality. In doing this local government responds to the uneven forces of
development which create unique conditions in each town in the country. Local
government may simply ameliorate the effects of the larger political economy,
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or it may be-a pressure point for an economy based on the satisfaction of
community meed. This points to the potential r~1,eof local goverqment in
development
All the interpretations of the role of local government accord great. weight to
the nation and the economy, Local government is subject to obsolescence and
redefinition if not serving the functional needs of the economy and national
centre. Contemporary local government remains under the influence of the
economy and nation, at the expense of a base in the community, This points to
the need for loca1t government autonomy,
In the case of Middelburg the Council.does not fulfil a representative role, but
simply 'reflects the interests of those wh~ are full participants in the national
political economy « the companies that haVe invested in the town, the large
fanners in adjacent-areas, and the white residential areas. The Council is
divorced from the interests of the majority of.the residents, a point reflected in
the tensions and opposition that has permeated the town over the last few
years, and the development path that the Council foresees for the town,
The Town Council is fecusing on the expansion of the large-scale
manufacturing sector for its future development. It is depending on its position
relative to the PWV to draw industry, and the existing presence of a few large
factories. The Council sees its role as maintaining the development of
infrastructure to facilitate such development. Council officials are wary ot
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development paths that are orientated more towards the needs of majority of
the community. Officials also fear the effect of "third world" standards on the
town.
''' ..'
.The Council would appear to be rooted in the neo-classical role of local
government, in that it is concerned to provide those goods that the market will
(";
not provide in its routine working. In a context where the Council simply has
to look to its property owning constituents for support, this inevitably results in
services geared to the needs of wealthier residents, and corporate activities.
Yet Middelburg has not shown su!?stantial industrial growth-since the mid-
.'\
1960s, and 'the wisdom of the developn\~nt path outlined can be questioned. It
is clear that the development path outlined is .likely to favour those presently
skilled and central to the political process of the town.
The Council's development l1ath, based as it is in the interests of a section of
the town's population, offers little to those exc1l1ded thus.far from the town
iA{"
and its services, facilities and economic activity. It is tlot(( development path
based in the locality and its needs, giJrived from a proces$~qf social bargaining.",
As such it is illegitimate. Notwithstanding the Council's reluctance to engage
in a development path that will serve the majority of the town's population,
(\certain suggestions are made.
International evidence suggests that small town growth is promoted with
policies that are focused on the region in which the town is situated, and
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sectors ill which labour intensity is high. Agriculture and agro-processing, in
particular, can make a great contribution to development, particularly in
association with policies of land reform and redistribution. Such development
is also more egalitarian.
In the case of Middelburg the town has a range of factors which support such a
development path. The Council can playa valuable rolein re-orientating the
town to facilitate such development. The Council has a skill base which can be
utilised for the development of the town, including planning, en:;,ineering and
financial skills. TheCouncil is, however, constrained by inadequate revenue at
present.
Development, then, should be based in the locality aimed at generating
economic activity, services and facilities accessible to and affordable by all in
'::
the tOWIl.
u
"/
Such ~ development path, focused on economic activity based on agriculture
,
,
and agro-processing, construction and trade, offers greater opportunities for the
provision of incomes than that proposed by the Council. Yet it is not
necessarily exclusive of that proposed by the Council _,in a market driven
economy economic de,lelopment has a momentum which is r{~)tunder the
"
control, or at points under the i\)fluence of the Council. The example of
'\
\\
electricity comes to mind - whetfi;~ror not the Councilor other local
authorities in the area approved, the power stations were likely to have been
oI)
117
built, as they are driven by a national need for electricity. ,The coal is if{·the
area, and transporting the coal to the power stations would clearly not be
o
I)
economical. The national economy, and national priorities, imposed themselves
on the town and its Council. While certain development projects and priorities,
then, are not subject to the control of local forces, the local nevertheless has a
considerable role to play and influence in development. It. is this that the
Council, by virtue of its unrepresentative nature, and orientation to particular
actors in the town and sectors of the population, has ignored. The argument,
then, hfor a more locally-based, and community-based development.
In such development the Council has a three-fold function. Firstly, the
!
::Z", provision of urban services that are accessible and affordable. Secondly, a
:::':"~::~
broader role initiating and facilitating~~velopment projects that will benefit the
.. " <~-::::::;;_;:<~"
residents and re-orientate the town to its population. Thirdly, the Council can
function as an affirmative action agency, addressing racial and gender
discrimination in particular, both in its own ranks and in the wider town.
Such a develop~pt role is, of course, subject to institutional capacity being in
place. In the international sphere local governments are constrained in
developing the local economy by a range of problems, key amongst which is a
lack of institutional capacity l which takes the form of a lack of skilled staff and
a lack of financial resources.
,/""',
.·L\. c;,
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Middelburg has the extensive skills within the Council. These skills include
engineering, planning and financial. skills. The Council does, however, suffer
from a lack of finance with which to play more of a role.
Internationally, revenue' sources available to local government are often limited
by a range of factors, amongst them the ter.clency of central government to
retain taxes which are ..politically and administratively easily collected for its
own use, a lack of resources available \ ;mx collection, especially skilled
personnel, administrative systems that are unable to collect taxes, community
resistance to the payment of local government charges, and a political process
that promotes 'tax-bashing'.
Local governments need, by and large, !,.utiler sources of revenue, the ability
to vary the level of revenue, and flekibility to spend revenue.
SA local government is not as unique as might be thought. It is apparent that
the town of Middelburg is dependant on the "white" town, industrial and
Commercial districts for the revenue with which to provide services .. In
particular, it is dependant on rates, service charges, and, to a lesser extent,
subsidies, for revenue, For capital expenditure it is dependant on the capital
markets. In general the finances of the town, as it is presently constituted (ie
as the "white'! town) are in a healthy state. The town also enjoys good
relations with the state) notwithstanding a range of restrictions on its activity
which limit its deve!('¥iucM: i);ilo:::·~.
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Substantial scope exists to increase revenue from the pre~~~t sources of
II
'\finance. Additional revenue sources are also necessary, b~'t the Council is
, ))
constrained by central state legislation which limits the form of revenue
collection it can engage in. It also d@S not have easy access to easily collected
forms of revenue, which are under the control-of the central state.
;(
Implicit in the argument above is the assertion that local government should be
autonomous and independent to the maximum degree possible. Such autonomy
is, at the one level, a prerequisite for effective local government that is rooted
in the locality and responsive to the locality. At another level it secures local ('
government to a degree from the demands of nation and economy.
In the Anglo-American tradition of prevalent in SA local government
originated specifically to provide services to emerging industrial and
a ~
commercial enterprises. Over time it came, also, to be an instrument of\
national government. Local government has never escaped its subordination to
industry and commerce, and its subordination to the national centre. In
Middelburg it is argued that local government is influenced by the demands of
incustry ~n'Jcommerce to the neglect of a role that is of benefit to the mass of
the population of the town. So, too, has local government been influenced by
the natioraIri the SA context, the notion"of the nation being white has run
deep. It retains a hold over Council officials in the present period.
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But the influence of these concepts is not one of the past necessarily. The
experience of Africa is that "nation-building" has led to the undermining and
even demise of local government in many countries. The dictates of economic
development in the context of a shortage of capital has led to the centralisation
of resources in the name of efficiency, and sad consequences for local
government. Both of these outcomes reflect the fact that the interests expressed
in local government are frequently at odds with the interests hegemonic in the
larger economy and the central state. ,
South Africa is certainly confronted with the need for national reconciliation
() ,
and nation-building.iand the need fof economic development. It cannot:be
assumed that SOt(1Afi;ica will avoid the fate of local government in many
African nations. Autonomous, locally-based and accountable local government
pursuing community-based develop~~nt wi~,however, help to avoid tt, To
help foster such institutions is a task of development planners.
I'.\
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